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ALLOCATING THE COSTS OF THE CLIMATE CRISIS:
EFFICIENCY VERSUS JUSTICE
Amy Sinden∗
Abstract: In the international negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement to reduce the
greenhouse-gas emissions that are driving global warming, the developed and developing
countries are talking past each other. The developed world is speaking the language of
efficiency, while the developing world speaks the language of justice. Economic theory and
the concept of efficiency are fine for answering the question of who should reduce, but that is
not the contentious issue. When it comes to the hotly contested issue of who should pay,
economic theory offers no guidance, and the developing world is right to insist that we look
to principles of justice. This Article considers three kinds of approaches to the who-shouldpay question: 1) those that take status quo emissions levels as their starting point; 2) those
that allocate emissions rights on a per capita basis; and 3) those that allocate the costs of
emissions reductions on the basis of ability to pay. The Article then considers three possible
models for conceptualizing the who-should-pay question in light of widely shared principles
of justice: 1) the property model views it as a problem of dividing and allocating a commonly
held property right—the capacity of the atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gases; 2) the tort
model views it as a question of how to allocate costs when one party causes injury to another;
and 3) the tax model views it as a situation in which a group of persons or entities are all
engaged in a common enterprise to promote the common good and must allocate the costs of
that enterprise. The Article evaluates each of the three approaches to the who-should-pay
question under each of these three models of justice, and concludes that the per capita
approach is the clear winner. It comports best with the property and tort models of justice,
and with respect to the tax model, it comes in a close second. A rough calculation reveals
that, if a per capita approach is indeed the most just, then the recent proposals by developing
countries that the developed countries each contribute 1% of their gross domestic product to
adaptation and mitigation efforts in the developing world is quite reasonable, perhaps even a
bargain. Finally, the Article considers and responds to several counterarguments against the
per capita approach.
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INTRODUCTION
As we face increasingly dire warnings from the scientific community
about the perils of the climate crisis, the need to reach an effective and
meaningful international agreement to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions
becomes ever more urgent. The question of who should reduce is not
actually that controversial. The contentious issue is who should pay both
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the costs of the reductions (mitigation) and the costs of coping with the
damage that has already become inevitable (adaptation). On the whoshould-reduce question, there is broad agreement that it will be most
“efficient,” and therefore best, to first implement those emissions
reductions that are cheapest (many of which will be in the developing
world), and then move progressively toward those that are more
expensive. Most people are comfortable with the idea that efficiency, in
the sense of cost-effectiveness, is an appropriate goal in this context, and
economic theory usefully demonstrates that either a cap-and-trade
program or a tax scheme will produce an efficient and desirable result by
inducing a given amount of emissions reduction for the cheapest
aggregate price.
This broad consensus breaks down, however, on the question of who
should pay. On the one hand, the United States and other developed
countries point to the large aggregate emissions of countries like China
and India and argue that it is pointless for the developed world to take
expensive steps to reduce emissions until the developing countries
commit to do likewise. The developing world, on the other hand, argues
the developed countries caused the problem to begin with, and should
therefore take the lead in solving it and bear the lion’s share of the costs.
This clash of views played out in the lead up to the Copenhagen Climate
Conference last fall, as U.S. negotiators balked at proposals by several
developing countries that the developed countries each set aside 1% of
their gross domestic product (GDP) to pay for mitigation and adaptation
efforts in the developing world.1 Indeed, the agreement that came out of
the Copenhagen talks, under which the developed countries committed
to establish a Green Climate Fund that will reach $100 billion per year
by 2020, falls far short of that goal.2
1. Sasha Chavkin, Paying for Rain, MOTHER JONES, Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 50, 50, available at
http://motherjones.com/environment/2009/11/bolivia-paying-rain (describing Bolivian President’s
calls for developed nations to contribute 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) to a United Nations
Fund for poor countries, and the endorsement of this position by Venezuela and Nicaragua); China
Demands Richer Countries Allocate 1% of GDP to Fight Global Warming, BELFAST TELEGRAPH,
Oct. 28, 2008, http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/breaking-news/world/asia/china-demands-richercountries-allocate-1-of-gdp-to-fight-global-warming-14018542.html (describing China’s calls for
developed nations to spend 1% of GDP to deal with climate change); Where Countries Stand on
Copenhagen, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8345343.stm (last visited Mar. 25, 2010)
(describing China’s position that developed countries should spend 1% of GDP per year to help
developing countries adapt, and describing the “Small Island Nations” position that at least 1% of
developed nations’ GDP should be spent on “climate-inflicted damage”).
2. See James Kanter, Copenhagen’s One Real Accomplishment: Getting Some Money Flowing,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/21/business/energy-environment/
21iht-green21.html?_r=2&bl). U.S. GDP is currently approximately $14.4 trillion, so 1% of U.S.
GDP alone is around $140 billion per year. See Press Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Gross
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This is not simply a problem of conflicting self-interests. If each side
were simply arguing to promote its own selfish ends, at least they would
be on the same wavelength. But the problem runs far deeper. The
developed and developing worlds are speaking entirely different
languages. The developed world is speaking the language of economics3
while the developing world speaks the language of justice.4 If we are
going to make any progress in forging an international solution to the
climate crisis and preserving a livable planet for our grandchildren,
however, those in the developed world must come to understand that,
when it comes to who should pay, the developing world is right to insist
on justice, not efficiency.
Economic theory is fine for finding answers to the first question—
who should reduce—because this is at bottom a question of aggregate
social welfare, or “efficiency.” By wisely allocating greenhouse-gas
reductions, we can minimize the costs to society as a whole. But the
second question—who should pay—is of an entirely different kind. It is
not a question of how much aggregate social welfare we can produce,
but of how that welfare should be distributed. As such, it raises
questions that economic theory cannot answer. These are questions not
of efficiency, but of justice.5 As the United States enters international
negotiations in the wake of the failed Copenhagen talks, it would be
prudent to recognize the limitations of the efficiency principle and
instead take long-standing and widely shared principles of justice as at
least one starting point in crafting a new climate change policy.6

Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 2009 (Advanced Estimate) 3 (Jan. 29, 2010),
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2010/pdf/gdp4q09_adv.pdf.
3. Dale Jamieson, Ethics, Public Policy, and Global Warming, in DALE JAMIESON, MORALITY’S
PROGRESS: ESSAYS ON HUMANS, OTHER ANIMALS, AND THE REST OF NATURE 282, 285 (2002) (“In
recent years, economic vocabularies and ways of reasoning have dominated the discussion of social
issues. Participants in the public dialogue have internalized the neoclassical economic perspective to
such an extent that its assumptions and biases have become almost invisible.”).
4. See Louise Gray, Copenhagen Climate Summit: Developing Countries Warn of “Absolute
Devastation,” THE TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/
copenhagen-climate-change-confe/6764877/Copenhagen-climate-summit-developing-countrieswarn-of-absolute-devastation.html (quoting Lumumba Stanislaus Di-Aping, chairman chief
negotiator of the G77 group, as saying the developed world has a “‘moral obligation’ to cut
greenhouse gases”).
5. See infra notes 11–28 and accompanying text; see generally Amy Sinden, The Abandonment of
Justice, in ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 107 (David M. Driesen ed.,
forthcoming 2010).
6. See Cecilia Albin, Rethinking Justice and Fairness: The Case of Acid Rain Emissions
Reductions, 21 REV. INT’L STUD. 119, 119 (1995) (arguing that agreements to address international
environmental issues must “be viewed as fair and just if they are to be politically accepted,
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The language of economics has obscured the distributional questions
that lie at the heart of the climate-change debate. By focusing on
efficiency and aggregate social welfare, the economic rhetoric of the
developed world implicitly and unselfconsciously embraces a status quo
distribution of emissions rights, with allocations made proportional to
existing emissions levels. When we look at the question of who should
pay through the lens of justice, however, the distributional issues come
into sharp focus and point toward a very different solution. Indeed, no
matter how we conceptualize the question from the perspective of
justice, a status quo distribution consistently emerges as the worst
solution. Conversely, a per capita allocation of emissions rights easily
emerges as the best (i.e., most just) solution.
Thus, when developing countries push for a per capita allocation of
emissions entitlements in international negotiations, those in the
developed world need to understand that the developing countries have
justice on their side. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that even
under a per capita allocation that is purely prospective (and thus leaves
the historical debt of the developed world unaccounted for), the United
States owes a “carbon debt” to the developing world of roughly 4.7
metric tons of CO2 per year.7 If we assume the value of a metric ton of
CO2 to be $28, that puts the U.S. annual carbon debt at right around 1%
of GDP. While attaching a dollar figure to the “value” of carbon dioxide
emissions is fraught with difficulty and controversy, $28 per metric ton
is well within the mid-range of recent prominent estimates.8 In this light,
the developing countries’ request that developed countries each
contribute 1% of GDP to the developing countries as part of a climate
change treaty seems eminently reasonable.9
Part I of this Article reviews the basic concepts of economic theory.
In so doing, it explains how the efficiency principle helps to answer the
who-should-reduce question, and yet offers no guidance on the whoshould-pay question. Instead, the efficiency principle obscures
distributional issues and implicitly promotes the status quo.
Part II reviews various approaches for answering the who-should-pay
question. These proposals cluster in three categories: 1) the status quo
approaches; 2) the per capita approaches; and 3) the ability-to-pay
approaches.
implemented and honoured in the long term,” yet most research and negotiation focuses instead on
economic effectiveness).
7. See infra notes 173–79 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 182–98 and accompanying text.
9. See supra note 1.
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Part III asks the question: What is just? From the perspective of
justice, the who-should-pay question can be conceptualized under three
different models: 1) the property model views it as a problem of
allocating a commonly held resource; 2) the tort model views it as a
question of how to allocate costs when one party causes injury to
another; and 3) the tax model views it as a situation in which a group is
engaged in a common enterprise to promote the common good and must
allocate the costs of that enterprise. Part III analyzes the various
proposals identified in Part II under each of these three models and
concludes that the per capita approach outperforms the others. It
comports best with the property and tort models, and, with respect to the
tax model, it comes in a close second. The status quo approach, on the
other hand, performs the worst under all three models.
Part IV sets out a back-of-the-envelope calculation to get a rough idea
of the magnitude of the transfer of wealth from the developed to the
developing world that a per capita approach would implicate. As noted
above, U.S. carbon debt to the developing world comes out to roughly
4.7 billion metric tons of CO2 for just one year. On reasonable
assumptions, this could easily amount to a payment on the order of 1%
of U.S. GDP, which is what the developing countries proposed in the
lead-up to Copenhagen.10 Finally, Part V considers and responds to some
of the major counterarguments that opponents of the per capita approach
have put forward.
I.

ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE CONCEPT OF EFFICIENCY:
MISDIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM

Welfare economics traces its roots to utilitarianism and is built around
the normative standard of “efficiency”—the maximization of aggregate
social welfare.11 Defining “welfare” is of course problematic. In order to
avoid the philosophical conundrums involved in making interpersonal
welfare comparisons,12 economists adopt the concept of “preference
satisfaction” or “willingness to pay” as the currency of individual wellbeing.13 Thus, economists can get a measure of well-being, or “utility,”

10. See supra note 1.
11. See E. J. MISHAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS: TEN INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS 13–17 (1964).
12. See Oscar Lange, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 10 ECONOMETRICA 215, 215
(1942); Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 352 (1999). But
see id. at 356–60 (arguing that interpersonal welfare comparisons are possible).
13. See e.g., Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 549–50 (1939).
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by simply observing people’s willingness to pay for things as expressed
in markets.14
In its purest form, economic efficiency is defined by the Pareto
principle. One state of affairs is a “Pareto improvement” over another if
it would result in at least one person being better off and no one being
worse off.15 A situation is “Pareto efficient” if there is no alternative
state of affairs that would be a Pareto improvement.16 Under the laws of
welfare economics, Pareto efficiency will be produced by a perfectly
functioning market.17 But markets are never really perfect, of course.
Where markets fail for one reason or another, economic theory calls for
government intervention in the form of a regulatory scheme calibrated to
mimic the economically efficient outcome that a perfectly functioning
market would have produced—that is, a regulatory scheme that meets
the test of cost-benefit analysis.18
The problem is that any attempt to use Pareto efficiency as the
standard for judging the efficiency of government intervention is
impractical. Because almost all government action harms at least one
person, virtually all government intervention would fail a Paretoefficiency test. Accordingly, for these purposes, economists turn to a
slightly less appealing but more practical standard known as “potential
Pareto” or “Kaldor-Hicks” efficiency.19 A government policy or
regulation is “efficient” in the Kaldor-Hicks sense if those who would
benefit from the regulation could fully compensate those who would lose
and still be better off.20
Efficiency, then, is a measure of aggregate social welfare.21 And
because the hypothetical transfer of wealth from winners to losers under
14. See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103,
129–30 (1979).
15. See Gerard Debreu, Valuation Equilibrium and Pareto Optimum, 40 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
588, 588 (1954).
16. See id.
17. See ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 53
(1996).
18. See id. at 2, 28–35.
19. Id. at 32; see David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 579–80 (1997) (“[D]ecisions
producing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency do not have the virtues associated with free market exchange”
because they do not involve consensual transactions.).
20. Or, put another way, a regulation is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if, following a hypothetical
transfer of wealth from the winners to the losers, the resulting state of affairs would be a Pareto
improvement. See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 390.
21. The Kaldor-Hicks standard assumes that wealth is a proxy for welfare, a problematic
assumption to say the least. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (5th ed.,
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Kaldor-Hicks efficiency need not actually occur, this efficiency standard
is entirely insensitive to how welfare is distributed.22 As long as the
welfare of all members of society combined is maximized, it does not
matter if some benefit at the expense of others. Thus, a world in which
Bill Gates owned all the wealth while others starved and an alternative
world in which the same amount of wealth were distributed equally
among all individuals could each be equally “efficient” under a KaldorHicks test.23 Economics, as it is often said, shows us how to produce the
largest pie, leaving to politics the task of determining how that pie
should be divided up and distributed through tax or welfare programs.24
Because it is indifferent to the distribution of wealth, the efficiency
principle uncritically accepts the status quo distribution of wealth as its
starting point. Thus, while purporting to be neutral with respect to
wealth distribution, in actuality it implicitly favors the status quo.25
Economic theory favors the status quo distribution of wealth in other
subtle ways as well. By measuring value in terms of money, for
example, it gives more weight to the preferences of rich people than
poor people. This is a well-known conundrum in economic theory, often
referred to as the problem of wealth effects.26 Because an additional
dollar is more valuable to a poor person than to a rich person and
because a poor person’s willingness to pay is constrained by her ability
to pay, a poor person’s willingness to pay for a particular good will
generally be lower than a rich person’s, even if the poor person values
the good just as much.27 Economic theory (and the efficiency principle)
Aspen 1998); C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
3, 6, (1975); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33
STAN. L. REV. 387, 401–07 (1981); Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 478–79 (1974).
22. See Sen, supra note 12, at 352.
23. Pareto efficiency is also indifferent to distributional issues to the extent that it takes the
existing distribution of wealth as a given. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS:
ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 33–34 (2004). Some
economists attempt to account for the decreasing marginal utility of money by using “distributive
weights,” which attempt to account for the fact that a dollar is worth more to a poor person than to a
rich person. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 72–73 (2006). Using such a method, the two worlds described above would not
be equivalent, because each dollar would be understood to be more valuable to poor people than to
rich people. But distributive weighting techniques are controversial and fraught with difficulty. Id.
at 152.
24. See Kaldor, supra note 13, at 550–51; Sen, supra note 12, at 351–52.
25. See Baker, supra note 21, at 6; Kennedy, supra note 21, at 401–07.
26. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 23, at 72–73.
27. As a result, it is a common practice in cost-benefit analyses of climate change to value the
lives of people in the developed world significantly higher than those in the developing world. See,
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thus routinely undercount the values of the poor in relation to those of
the rich.
Additionally, by aggregating costs and benefits, the efficiency
principle obscures issues of causation and responsibility. The notion that
one group of people would cause bodily harm to another group in order
to achieve incremental, non-needs-related consumption gains would
seem to violate ethical norms under virtually any system.28 And yet, the
efficiency principle sanctions such results.
Indeed, it is fundamental to the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion that
it trades off gains to one set of people for losses to another. The theory is
that implementing a policy that is Kaldor-Hicks efficient has the
potential to leave all individuals better off than they were before. In a
state of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, it is by definition true that if the
winners compensated the losers for their losses, the winners would still
have some gains left over. But there is nothing about the Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency criterion itself that actually requires such a transfer to take
place.
Within a domestic political system, the use of Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency can be defended on the ground that, once policies are
implemented to achieve efficiency, the “bigger pie” can be re-distributed
among members of society according to principles of equity and justice
through taxing and spending programs enacted by the government. This
argument is problematic, not least because Kaldor-Hicks efficiency often
requires trading lives for money. But on the global scale, the problem
runs even deeper. Because there is no government with authority to
redistribute resources across national borders, we cannot assume that any
inequitable distributions that occur as a byproduct of the pursuit of
efficiency can be cured at all.
e.g., SAMUEL FANKHAUSER, VALUING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE GREENHOUSE
47–48 (1995) (using a statistical value of life in “high income” countries of $1,500,000, in “middle
income” countries of $300,000, and in “low income” countries of $100,000). These differing
“values of a statistical life” (VSL) are based on studies in different regions investigating people’s
willingness to pay to avoid risk (or willingness to accept payment to take on risk). Id. The results of
such studies can vary dramatically in different regions of the world. While in the United States, such
studies yield a median VSL of approximately $7 million, see W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life, in
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 586, 586 (2d ed., Steven N.
Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume, eds., 2008), studies of VSL in the developing world have produced
values as low as $20,000, see, e.g., K. PARIKH ET AL., VALUING AIR POLLUTION IN BOMBAY
(1994), cited in Samuel Fankhauser, Richard S. J. Tol & David W. Pearce, Extensions and
Alternatives to Climate Change Impact Valuation: On the Critique of IPCC Working Group III’s
Impact Estimates, 3 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 59, 67–68 (1998).
28. See Christian Azar & Thomas Sterner, Discounting and Distributional Considerations in the
Context of Global Warming, 19 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 169, 170 (1996).
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The question of who should pay is fundamentally a question of
distribution. As such, economic theory and the principle of efficiency
offer no guidance.29 For the who-should-pay question, we must instead
turn to principles of justice and fairness.30 The question of who should
reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, on the other hand, is a question about
how big we can make the pie, and, as such, is an appropriate question for
economics.
A.

Economic Theory’s Answer to Who Should Reduce: Taxes or Capand-Trade

Economic theory demonstrates that we can get the largest aggregate
amount of pollution reduction at the lowest cost by implementing either
a tax or a cap-and-trade scheme. To see why such schemes are
theoretically efficient, first imagine the most prominent alternative: a
traditional permit system. Under such a system, the government issues
permits requiring each polluter to reduce its emissions by a particular
amount. A polluter that fails to comply with its permit limits pays a fine.
If all polluters faced identical pollution-control costs, such a system
29. See Kaldor, supra note 13, at 550–51; Sen, supra note 12, at 351–52; see also ADLER &
POSNER, supra note 23, at 186 (“The purpose of [cost-benefit analysis], as typically understood, is
to separate out the distributional issue and isolate the efficiency issue, so that the agency will
evaluate projects solely on the basis of their efficiency.”); WARWICK J. MCKIBBEN & PETER J.
WILCOXEN, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY AFTER KYOTO: BLUEPRINT FOR A REALISTIC APPROACH 67
(2002) (“Economists are trained to worry about efficiency and to leave matters of equity and
distribution to policymakers. With climate change, however, that dichotomy is untenable.”); Joseph
E. Aldy et al., Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures, 3
CLIMATE POL’Y 373, 377 (2003) (acknowledging that although distributional issues are
“exceptionally important” in climate change policy, no method exists for incorporating these issues
into the analysis of efficiency); Jamieson, supra note 3, at 286–87; Laurence H. Tribe,
Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 594–95
(1985) (“[The] disregard of the distributional dimension of any given problem is characteristic of
the entire law-and-economics school of thought, which assumes a world in which no one is
economically coerced and in which individuals who do not ‘buy’ things are said to be ‘unwilling,’
rather than unable, to do so.”). But see Matthew D. Adler, Risk Equity: A New Proposal, 32 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (arguing that questions of distributional justice are “firmly grounded in
the social-welfare-function tradition in welfare economics” and proposing a new method for
incorporating such questions into government decision making).
30. Adam Rose et al., International Equity and Differentiation in Global Warming Policy, 12
ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 25, 25–26 (1998) (asserting that efficiency is not enough when
addressing global warming policy; equity considerations are also crucial and may play a practical
role as unifying principles that help facilitate international agreement: “Many analysts of the issue
have concluded that greater cooperation is likely to be forthcoming if the policy process,
implementation decision, and outcomes are perceived to be fair”). But see Wilfred Beckerman &
Joanna Pasek, The Equitable International Allocation of Tradable Carbon Emission Permits, 5
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 405, 411 (1995) (“It is doubtful, however, if any theories of justice can
provide much help in determining the international allocation of [emissions] permits.”).
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would be just as efficient as a tax or cap-and-trade scheme. But, in fact,
pollution-control costs usually vary significantly from facility to facility.
Accordingly, a traditional permit scheme requires polluters for whom
reduction is expensive to reduce just as much as polluters for whom
reduction is cheap.
A tax or a cap-and-trade scheme, on the other hand, induces more
pollution reduction from those for whom it is cheap and less from those
for whom it is expensive. Under a pollution tax, each polluter has to pay
some amount of money to the government for every unit of pollution it
releases into the atmosphere. The polluters for whom pollution reduction
is cheap will reduce pollution levels rather than pay the tax. But the
polluters for whom pollution reduction is expensive will simply pay the
tax rather than reduce pollution. Thus, for any given tax rate, more of the
pollution reduction will come from those for whom it is cheaper, and
less will come from those for whom it is expensive. In this way, a tax
can achieve the same aggregate amount of pollution reduction for less
cost than a traditional regulatory scheme that simply demands the same
amount of pollution reduction from each polluter.31
A cap-and-trade scheme reaches the same result in a different way.
First, the government (or some international body) sets an overall cap on
the amount of pollution it will allow all sources in the aggregate to emit.
Then it prints up a number of tradable allowances equal to the total
amount of the cap and distributes them. It may distribute them through
an auction, or it may hand them out to firms or individuals (or countries)
for free based on some criterion like existing emissions levels or equal
per capita shares. Finally, it tells the polluters they must have an
allowance for each unit of pollution they emit. This creates a market in
pollution allowances. As with a tax, those for whom pollution reduction
is cheapest do most of the reducing. Firms for whom pollution reduction
is cheap will reduce their pollution levels a lot and then sell their excess
allowances and make a profit. Firms for whom reducing pollution costs
more than the price of an allowance will prefer to simply buy extra
allowances on the market and pollute more. The result is a cost-effective
system of pollution reduction, much like that which would be achieved

31. See TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 51–54
(1992). In an economist’s ideal world, the government would set the tax rate at the dollar amount
precisely equal to the marginal social cost of the pollutant and let the market determine the overall
pollution level. In practice, however, such precise calculations of social costs are impossible. See
Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U.
COLO. L. REV. 533, 555 & n.65 (2007).
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under a tax.32 In fact, from the standpoint of economic theory, the two
systems are generally equivalent.33
B.

Distributional Implications of Taxes and Cap-and-Trade

Tax and cap-and-trade schemes are thus lauded for their efficiency,
but their distributional implications often remain unexamined.
Technically, any distributional scheme is possible under a tax or a capand-trade system. It all depends on how the tax revenues are distributed
under a tax, and how either the auction revenues or the allowances
themselves are distributed under a cap-and-trade.34 But in practice,
particularly at the global scale, such systems tend to promote a status
quo distribution. Because there is no global institution for collecting and
distributing tax or auction revenues, taxes or cap-and-trade systems are
likely to be administered by national governments. The revenues
generated by a tax or an auction are therefore likely to be collected by
32. The idea was first developed by Canadian economist J.H. Dales in 1968. J.H. DALES,
POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES: AN ESSAY IN POLICY MAKING AND ECONOMICS 93–98
(1968). Nearly two decades later, it was introduced into the legal literature by Bruce Ackerman and
Richard Stewart. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988); Richard B.
Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
153 (1988); Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
If, in fact, the global cap on greenhouse-gas emissions must ultimately be reduced to zero, or near
zero, trading in allowances will eventually slow down and then stop altogether. As the cap declines
toward zero, eventually, there will no longer be enough allowances to create a functioning market.
At this point, the program would operate like a traditional regulatory permit scheme.
33. More precisely, the economics literature shows that where the regulator knows the marginal
costs of pollution control, then taxes and trading are equivalent—that is, they can be used to achieve
exactly the same outcomes. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 58 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1975) (“It is clear that when
the relevant functions are known with certainty by a welfare-maximizing regulator, exactly the same
result will be achieved by a market in allowances permits and by a system of effluent charges.”);
M.L. Weitzman, Prices Versus Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974). Where the costs of
control are not known (as is typically true in practice), there is substantial debate as to which system
is better. See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, Correlated Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Choice, 30 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 218, 219–29 (1996) (asserting that where there is uncertainty about both
costs and benefits, and where those two uncertainties are correlated—if costs are under-estimated,
benefits are also under-estimated—then trading will be more efficient); Weitzman, supra, at 479–85
(asserting that where there is uncertainty about costs, which instrument produces the more efficient
result will depend on the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and cost curves); William Pizer,
Prices vs. Quantities Revisited: The Case of Climate Change 19 (Resources for the Future
Discussion Paper No. 98-02, 1997) (arguing taxes are better in climate change context).
34. See Rose, supra note 30, at 29 (noting that same distributional results can be achieved by
either distributing permits in cap-and-trade or distributing tax revenues under a tax).
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national governments and perceived as rightly belonging to the national
government that collected them, unless, as described below, there is
some system for distributing allowances across national boundaries.
If the costs of cutting emissions were roughly the same throughout the
world, then a globally uniform tax imposed by each national government
would induce approximately the same percentage reduction in each
country. If every country imposed a tax of $20 per ton of CO2, for
example, we might expect that to result in emissions reductions of
roughly 15% in each country.35 Under such a scenario, the United States
would reduce its emissions from 7 to 6.3 billion tons, and India would
reduce its emissions from 1.5 to 1.35 billion tons.36 And while national
governments could use tax revenues to redistribute the costs of those
reductions any way they liked within their borders, each country would
bear the costs of its own reductions. The same result would occur if each
national government administered a cap-and-trade program and
auctioned the allowances.37
Either arrangement would essentially amount to a status quo or equalpercentage-reduction approach to the who-should-pay question.38 It
would be analogous to a flat tax.39 Countries with very low emissions
levels would have to bear the costs of cutting emissions by the same
percentage as countries with very high emissions levels.
In reality, a globally uniform tax would be even more regressive.
Because mitigation costs are generally lower in the developing world,
such a tax would undoubtedly result in a higher rate of abatement—more
tons of CO2 abated per ton of CO2 emitted—in the developing world
35. See WILLIAM NORDHAUS, THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC MODELS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 121–24. (2007).
36. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0573, EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE
UNITED STATES 2008 1 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/
0573%282008%29.pdf (reporting 2007 U.S. greenhouse-gas emissions of 7.209 billion metric tons
in CO2 equivalents); Subodh Sharma et al., Greenhouse Gas Emissions from India: A Perspective,
90 CURRENT SCI. 326, 328 (2006) (reporting 2000 greenhouse-gas emissions in India of 1.485
billion metric tons in CO2 equivalents).
37. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L. J. 1565, 1586
(2008) [hereinafter Posner & Sunstein, Justice] (noting the similarity between a uniform tax and a
cap-and-trade program that distributes allowances on the basis of existing emissions: “both take
existing emissions rates as the starting point”). This is the general form that the Kyoto protocol
took, at least with respect to those countries that took on binding emissions reduction targets. Those
targets were tied to existing emissions levels, with most countries agreeing to reduce emissions by
8% from 1990 levels. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 3.1 & annex B, opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (entered into
force Feb. 16, 2005) available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
38. See infra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
39. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
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than in the developed world.40 Thus, developing countries would bear
the costs of reducing their emissions by an even greater percentage than
developed countries.41
A more globally progressive tax system could not be implemented
without some international institution with the authority to redistribute
tax revenues across borders. Such an institution, which would look
perilously similar to a world government, is a political impossibility at
present. A global cap-and-trade system, on the other hand, that allocated
allowances among countries so as to achieve a more progressive
distribution of costs is perhaps more politically conceivable.42 One could
imagine, for example, an international cap-and-trade system under which
allowances were allocated to countries on a per capita basis. Under such
a scheme, while a lot of the reductions would occur in the developing
world where outdated technologies provide numerous opportunities for
low-cost reductions, the costs of those reductions would be borne largely
by the developed countries, which would have to buy allowances from
developing countries in order to support their present level of
development. Indeed, many developing countries would (initially, at
least) get more allowances than they had emissions, and thus could make
money by selling allowances to developed countries without reducing at
all.43 One might view these payments from the developed to the
developing world either as paying for future emissions cuts that the
developing world would have to make eventually as the cap ratcheted
down, or as helping to pay adaptation costs for harms that have already
been made inevitable.
Technically, a similar distribution could be achieved by wealthy
countries simply transferring a large share of the revenues they
generated through either a tax or an allowance auction to developing
countries. But no matter how well-intentioned, such a system would
have a very different feel. Once one country has collected tax or auction
revenues within its own borders, those revenues look and feel like the
legitimate property of that country. When that country then uses such
revenues to make a payment to others, the payment looks far more like a
discretionary charitable donation than like payment of a debt or an
40. See Kristen Sheeran, Beyond Kyoto: North-South Implications of Emissions Trading and
Taxes, 5 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 697, 700 (2007).
41. See Aldy et al., supra note 29, at 377, 382.
42. Such a system might adopt much of the same structure as the Kyoto Protocol, but extend
participation to all nations and use a different formula to determine each country’s emissions
reduction obligations.
43. This assumes a cap that starts higher and ratchets down over time.
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obligation owed. Furthermore, because collection of taxes and
distribution of revenues are fundamental powers of government, a global
institution with the power to effectuate such international transfers of tax
or auction revenues would look far too much like “world government” to
be politically saleable.
In sum, economic theory is helpful in answering the who-shouldreduce question. Who should pay, on the other hand, is fundamentally a
distributional question. As such, economic theory and the principle of
efficiency, or aggregate social welfare, in which it is grounded offers no
guidance. Indeed, economic theory contains implicit biases in favor of
the status quo that, as we will see in the following sections, are at odds
with widely accepted notions of fairness and justice.
II.

WHO SHOULD PAY? THREE APPROACHES

Many different approaches to the who-should-pay question have been
proposed, but they cluster roughly in three categories. The status quo
approaches involve various schemes that are the rough equivalent of
distributing allowances based on existing emissions. These approaches
take each country’s existing emissions levels as the starting point and
prescribe roughly equivalent percentage reductions from those levels.
The per capita approaches allocate emissions allowances to each country
in proportion to population. Finally, the ability-to-pay approaches
allocate allowances on the basis of financial need so that those with the
least wealth and resources receive the largest share of allowances. While
there are also plenty of hybrid proposals that combine elements of each
of these approaches,44 for the purposes of this analysis, it will be clearer
to treat each one separately.
A.

Status Quo Approaches

These approaches all explicitly or implicitly endorse the status quo
with respect to the level of emissions that each country produces. They
all start with each country’s existing level of emissions and require each
country to pay for roughly equal percentages of reductions from those
levels.45
44. See generally DANIEL BODANSKY, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE EFFORTS BEYOND 2012: A SURVEY OF APPROACHES (2004).
45. Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein use the same term—“status quo approach”—to refer to a
similar idea, which they characterize as “tempting.” See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should
Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51, 51 (2009)
[hereinafter Posner & Sunstein, Per Capita] (“It is tempting to suggest that the status quo, across
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Equal-Percentages Approach

A seemingly simple approach is to require each country to pay to
reduce its existing emissions by the same percentage.46 This was roughly
the formula first proposed in the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol (at
least among developed countries), before the United States insisted on
incorporating trading mechanisms into the accord.47 Assuming that
different countries face different emissions-control costs, of course, such
a system results in an inefficient answer to the who-should-reduce
question, because countries for whom emissions reduction costs are high
are forced to implement the same percentage reductions as those for
whom emissions reduction costs are low.48 This also has distributional
implications because, to the extent pollution control costs vary from
country to country, the costs borne by each country would not be equal,
even as a percentage of existing emissions.
2.

Allocation of Allowances Based on Existing Emissions

A similar approach that produces an efficient answer to the whoshould-reduce question imposes a global cap-and-trade program and
allocates allowances to each country based on existing emissions levels.
To the extent that the cap is lower than total existing emissions, each
country’s allocation is reduced by the same percentage. This achieves an
efficient allocation of emissions reductions and also achieves a certain
kind of equity, at least in comparison to the last approach. The costs
borne by each country do not depend on their per-unit emissions-control
costs. Rather, two countries with the same existing emissions levels
incur the same emissions-control costs.

nations, provides the appropriate baseline [for the allocation of emissions rights].”). See also
Michael Grubb, Seeking Fair Weather: Ethics and the International Debate on Climate Change, 71
INT’L AFF. 463, 487 (1995) (calling this approach the “status quo” approach).
46. This is the outcome of a globally uniform tax where all countries have similar marginal cost
curves. See infra Part II.A.3.
47. See Michael Grubb, Kyoto and the Future of International Climate Change Responses: From
Here to Where?, 5 INT’L REV. FOR ENVTL. STRATEGIES 1, 1 n.7, available at
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/rstaff/grubb/publications/J37.pdf (noting that the European Union
initially called for flat rate reductions of 10–15%); Derald J. Hay, Post-Kyoto Stress Disorder: How
the United States Can Influence International Climate Change Policy, 15 MO. ENVTL L. & POL’Y
REV. 494, 502 (2008) (“During the negotiations in Kyoto, the United States pushed for the adoption
of a framework to permit emissions trading among the nations as a means for nations to meet
obligations under the treaty.”).
48. See supra Part I.A.
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This is a common approach to trading schemes in general.49 It is also
the general approach the Kyoto Protocol took, at least among the
developed countries.50 Even the United States, which refused to ratify
Kyoto, endorsed this general principle.51 Indeed, the United States
objected to Kyoto precisely because it failed to make this principle
broadly applicable to all countries.52 Despite its prominence, this
proposal has the obvious drawback of rewarding past inefficiency in
carbon-based energy use.53
3.

Globally Uniform Tax

A variant on the status quo approach is a globally uniform tax. This is
an approach advocated by many economists.54 As noted above, the use
of a tax as the regulatory mechanism should have no distributional
implications in theory and thus should have no implications for the whoshould-pay question. In practice, however, a tax is very likely to have
distributional implications. Because tax revenues do not flow across
national boundaries, the costs of emissions reductions under a globally
uniform tax would remain in the country in which they were incurred.55
Assuming similar marginal-cost curves for reducing emissions in each
country, such a tax would produce roughly the same percentage of
emissions reductions (and the same percentage of costs) in each country.
In that case, a globally uniform tax would have the same distributional
effect as the equal-percentages approach. Assuming the marginal-cost
curves for reducing emissions in developing countries are lower
49. See Richard N. Cooper, Toward a Real Global Warming Treaty, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr.
1998, at 66, 70.
50. See Tom Tietenberg & David G. Victor, Possible Administrative Structures and Procedures
for Implementing a Tradeable Entitlement Approach to Controlling Global Warming, in UNITED
NATIONS, COMBATING GLOBAL WARMING 10 (1994) (“[T]he normal presumption for Annex I
countries would be that they would receive entitlements equal to their 1990 emissions levels.”);
Richard N. Cooper, The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept 15 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
(FEEM), Working Paper No. 52, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=278536 (noting that
Kyoto allocated emissions rights on the basis of historical emissions).
51. DONALD A. BROWN, AMERICAN HEAT: ETHICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE UNITED STATES’
RESPONSE TO GLOBAL WARMING 37–39, 70 (2002).
52. See Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
53. See WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL WARMING 352–53 (1992); Sujata Gupta
& Preety M. Bhandari, An Effective Allocation Criterion for CO2 Emissions, 27 ENERGY POL’Y 727,
729 (1999) (arguing the equal-percentages approach penalizes countries that are efficient in their
use of carbon-intensive energy).
54. See, e.g., CLINE, supra note 53, at 352; Cooper, supra note 49, at 74.
55. See Cooper, supra note 49, at 76 (“Each country would be free to dispose of the emission tax
revenues as it judged best.”).
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(probably a more realistic scenario), a globally uniform tax would be
even more regressive in its distributional effects than the status quo
approach. Under this scenario, because even more of the reductions
would occur in the developing world and because revenues would
remain within national borders, developing countries would pay to
reduce their emissions by an even larger percentage than developed
countries.56
Indeed, one could even imagine a situation in which a globally
uniform tax results in the developing world performing all of the
emissions reductions and bearing all the costs, while the developed
world pays nothing. Imagine there are just two countries on earth:
Country A is a developed country and Country B is a developing
country. In Country A, every ton of emissions reduction costs $6 or
more. In Country B, every ton of emissions reduction costs $4 or less.
Now imagine that both countries impose a globally uniform tax of $5 on
each ton of emissions. In Country A, no emissions reduction will occur
because polluters will pay the $5 tax on each ton of emissions they
produce rather than the $6 (or more) that it costs to reduce one ton of
emissions. The government will collect lots of tax revenue, which it can
distribute back to its citizens any way it likes, but the country as a whole
will incur zero emissions-control costs. Conversely, in Country B,
would-be polluters will instead eliminate every ton of emissions at $4 or
less in order to avoid paying the $5 tax. The government will collect no
tax revenue, but the country as a whole will incur large emissionscontrol costs. Indeed, Country B will incur all the emissions-control
costs for the world.
4.

Allocation of Allowances Based on GDP

Another approach would award allowances in a cap-and-trade
program on the basis of GDP.57 This approach is roughly equivalent to
the equal-percentages approach because GDP roughly tracks emissions,
but the GDP approach has the advantage of not directly rewarding
countries that have used carbon-intensive methods of energy
56. See supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text. A similar distribution would result from a
global cap-and-trade program in which all permits were auctioned by individual national
governments, but this option is less frequently treated as being entirely divorced from distributional
considerations. This is probably because cap-and-trade allows for the obvious possibility of an
alternative distribution scheme through the direct allocation of allowances.
57. See CLINE, supra note 53, at 353; David A. Wirth & Daniel A. Lashof, Beyond Vienna and
Montreal: A Global Framework Convention on Greenhouse Gases, 2 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 79, 101 (1992) .
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production.58 If two countries had the same GDP, but one achieved that
GDP by producing large amounts of carbon emissions and the other
managed to keep carbon emissions to a minimum, the equal percentages
approach would produce the perverse result of awarding more
allowances to the carbon-profligate country. The GDP approach, in
contrast, would award the same emissions quota to each country.
B.

Per Capita Approaches

While the last set of approaches all use a nation’s aggregate emissions
as their starting point, another set of approaches treats individual
emissions as the relevant unit of measure. These per capita approaches
are generally easiest to conceptualize in the context of a global cap-andtrade program. They are all grounded in the idea that each individual on
earth should be entitled to an equal share of the absorptive capacity of
the atmosphere. So under a global cap-and-trade program that took a per
capita approach, each individual would be entitled to an equal number of
allowances, or alternatively, each country would be allocated allowances
in proportion to its population. Because per capita emissions in the
developed world are currently many times larger than those in the
developing world, developed countries would have far too few
allowances to cover existing emissions. Conversely, most developing
countries would initially have allowances far in excess of their existing
emissions and would therefore have extra allowances to sell.
Accordingly, developed countries would, initially at least, have to pay
substantial sums of money to the developing world to buy allowances
from them. A similar distribution could theoretically be achieved
through the use of a tax, though it would require large transfers of tax
revenues across national borders.
1.

Prospective Equal Shares

Assuming a global cap-and-trade program, a prospective-equal-shares
approach would work by dividing the global cap by world population (as
of some specified date) to derive a yearly greenhouse-gas-emissions
quota for each individual. Each country59 would then be allocated an
58. See CLINE, supra note 53, at 353.
59. Ideally, an equal-shares approach would allocate allowances or shares directly to each
individual on earth. Indeed, some have proposed that national governments could administer
systems of personal carbon entitlements that would be tradable. But such schemes obviously present
formidable logistical challenges. See, e.g., Mayer Hillman, A Modest Proposal to Save the Planet,
THE INDEPENDENT (May 27, 2004), http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/a-modest-proposal-
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annual allotment of emissions allowances derived by multiplying its
population (on the specified date) by the individual quota.60 Per capita
emissions levels in developed countries might well continue to exceed
those in developing countries, but in order to do so the developed
countries would have to buy allowances from the developing world.61
The question of which population statistics to use raises some difficult
issues. If each country’s emissions budget were adjusted each year to
reflect changes in population, this would create a perverse incentive,
effectively rewarding those countries with the fastest growing
populations. This problem could be solved by arbitrarily picking a date
and using that date’s population statistics to allocate national
allowances.62 Some have proposed using 1990 population numbers.63
Peter Singer argues for using estimates of future population levels at
some agreed-upon date several decades into the future, in order to avoid
penalizing those countries with younger populations.64 But such an
approach would arguably have the effect of penalizing countries that

to-save-the-planet-564794.html. But in light of the fact that international relations rest
fundamentally on a system of mutual respect for national sovereignty, any global solution to climate
change will have to begin with an agreement to allocate the costs of mitigation among sovereign
nations rather than among individuals. See Gupta & Bhandari, supra note 53, at 728.
60. See Gupta & Bhandari, supra note 53, at 729. But see Henry Shue, Climate, in A COMPANION
TO ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 455 (Dale Jamieson ed., 2001) (arguing that each individual
should be entitled to the minimum share of emissions rights necessary to survival and that this
minimum share should be non-tradable: “A society in which food is available only for payment is a
brutal and uncivilized place. What is suggested here is merely the equivalent of food stamps on the
global level for vital emissions.”). See also BODANSKY, supra note 44, at 39 (describing an
approach grounded in human development goals which “[s]ets emission targets at levels that would
allow emissions to satisfy basic human needs, but would limit ‘luxury’ or ‘excessive’ emissions”).
61. Deciding which emissions to attribute to each country for accounting purposes is not
necessarily as straightforward as it might seem. Who, for example, should be held responsible for
the emissions produced by a factory in China that produces a toy bought by a consumer in the
United States? While the standard approach is to hold countries responsible for all the emissions
produced within their borders, a system that allocated emissions based on consumption instead
might arguably be more consistent with principles of causation on which notions of responsibility
are ultimately grounded. The choice of how to attribute responsibility for these emissions embodied
in the consumer goods that are traded across international borders is not trivial. Indeed, a recent
study found that the carbon embodied in U.S. imports from China in 2003 represented 6% of total
U.S. CO2 emissions. See Bin Shui & Robert C. Harriss, The Role of CO2 Embodiment in U.S.-China
Trade, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 4063, 4067 (2006).
62. See BRIAN BARRY, WHY SOCIAL JUSTICE MATTERS 257, 267 (2005) (arguing that current
population statistics should be used as long as rich countries implement proposed policies to keep
their population increase down). A similar effect would be created by Michael Grubb’s suggestion
that only people above a certain age be counted. See Grubb, supra note 45, at 486.
63. See BROWN, supra note 51, at 215.
64. PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 36 (2002).
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have already taken steps to limit population growth. China, for example,
now has a relatively old population as a result of its one-child policy.65
Some have also suggested that we should measure each nation’s
budget of greenhouse-gas emissions by taking into account not only each
country’s sources of emissions, but its terrestrial sinks as well. This
would involve estimating the amount of CO2 absorbed by forests and
other vegetation within the country’s borders. We might also further
reduce each country’s budget by its “fair share of the oceanic and
tropospheric sinks” that are outside the jurisdiction of any one country
and therefore part of the “common heritage of humankind.”66 Under this
kind of measurement system, some developing countries might well
have a zero or negative balance. For example, in the early 1990s, India
produced only 6% of the CO2 and 14.4% of the methane that is absorbed
by the earth’s ecological systems.67 Because India’s population at that
time comprised 16.2% of the world’s total population, under such a
scheme it would have had a negative emissions balance.68
2.

Historical Equal Shares

The prospective-equal-shares approach takes no account of history. It
simply looks at the distribution of the absorptive capacity of the
atmosphere at the present moment and asks how it might be fairly
distributed.69 But arguably, an equal-shares approach should also take
the historical distribution of emissions into account. Greenhouse gases
can remain in the atmosphere for centuries or even millennia after they
are emitted,70 and it is the total accumulation of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere that drives the greenhouse effect, rather than the flow of

65. Arguably, China ought to get some credit under a future-population scheme because of the
fact that it has already limited its population growth. Indeed, China takes the position that its onechild policy is part of its climate change policy, and has had the effect of preventing 1.3 billion tons
of annual CO2 emissions that would otherwise have occurred. See NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N,
P.R.C., CHINA’S NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME 11 (2007), http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/
newsrelease/P020070604561191006823.pdf.
66. See ANIL AGARWAL & SUNITA NARAIN, GLOBAL WARMING IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD: A
CASE OF ENVIRONMENTAL COLONIALISM 4 (1991).
67. See id. at 6.
68. Id.
69. The prospective-equal-shares approach applies what some philosophers would call “current
time-slice principles of justice.” See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 153–55
(1974).
70. See Alvaro Montenegro et al., Long Term Fate of Anthropogenic Carbon, 34 GEOPHYSICAL
RES. LETTERS L19707, 1 (2007) (concluding that “25% [of CO2 emissions] have lifetimes much
longer than 5000 years”).
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emissions into the atmosphere at any given time.71 Accordingly, we can
think of the greenhouse gases already emitted into the atmosphere over
the last century as having already begun to “use up” some of the
available absorptive capacity of the atmosphere. The United States, for
example, with less than 5% of the world’s population, is responsible for
well over 25% of the greenhouse gases currently accumulated in the
atmosphere.72
One way to try to account for history would be to imagine going back
in time and applying the prospective-equal-shares principle at the
moment humans first began using up the atmosphere’s absorptive
capacity by emitting greenhouse gases in substantial amounts. We
might, for example, imagine dividing the absorptive capacity of the
atmosphere into equal shares two centuries ago, at the eve of the
Industrial Revolution. We could then use this historical accounting to
hold the developed countries responsible for the atmospheric debt that
they have accrued over the last two hundred years.
Some have suggested beginning a historical accounting at a much
later date in order to avoid the conceptual difficulties involved in
holding a current generation responsible for the actions of previous
generations and in order to diffuse objections to holding countries
responsible for emissions that occurred before the harms associated with
those emissions were reasonably foreseeable.73 One might begin the
accounting in the late 1980s or early 1990s, for example.74
A historical-equal-shares approach would calculate the total amount
of global greenhouse-gas emissions that occurred between the start date
and the present date; it would then divide that total by the average world
population during that period to get a per capita carbon-emission
entitlement. Multiplying that per capita entitlement by each country’s
average population during that period would then yield a historical
71. See Richard B. Alley et al., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Summary
for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 17 (Susan Solomon et
al. eds., 2007) (“Both past and future anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions will continue to
contribute to warming and sea level rise for more than a millennium, due to the time scales required
for removal of this gas from the atmosphere.”).
72. See KEVIN A. BAUMERT, ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, NAVIGATING THE
NUMBERS: GREENHOUSE GAS DATA AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 32 (2005) (finding the
United States responsible for 29.3% of cumulative CO2 emissions from 1850 to 2002).
73. See infra Part V.C. and accompanying text.
74. See Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay, 23 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 1, 29–30 (2007) (suggesting 1992 as a cut-off date for apportioning responsibility for
climate change adaptation according to a polluter-pays principle); Lisa Heinzerling, Climate
Change, Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary Principle, 96 GEO. L.J. 445, 454–57 (2008)
(arguing that scientific consensus on climate change became clear in the late 1980s or early 1990s).
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allowance for each country. By comparing each country’s historical
allowance with its actual emissions during that period, we could then
calculate the amount by which each country’s actual total emissions
exceeded (or fell short of) its allowance. Those countries whose total
emissions exceeded their respective allowances would be required to
buy down their excess emissions by purchasing credits from those whose
total emissions fell short of their allowances.
3.

The Brazilian Proposal

Another approach that would take historical responsibility into
account was proposed by Brazil in a submission to the United Nations in
1997 in preparation for the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol.75 This
proposal did not take a strict per capita approach; like the agreement that
ultimately came out of the Kyoto negotiations, Brazil’s proposal left the
developing nations out of the proposal entirely. Like a per capita
approach, however, it put the initial burden of reducing greenhouse-gas
emissions and paying for those reductions on the developed countries,
requiring the Annex I76 countries to collectively reduce their emissions
to 30% below 1990 levels by 2020.77 But the Brazilian proposal also
took historical emissions into account. It specified that the burden of
reducing emissions to meet the 2020 target would fall on the Annex I
countries in proportion to each country’s relative share of responsibility
for the increase in global temperature from 1840 on.78 Under a complex
formula, the proposal would have required the United Kingdom to
reduce its emissions to 66% below 1990 levels by 2020, and the United
States to reduce by 23%.79 Trading emission allowances would have

75. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate,
7th Session, Bonn, F.R.G., July 31–Aug. 7, 1997, Implementation of the Berlin Mandate: Additional
Proposals from Parties, 7, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1/Add.3 (May 30, 1997)
[hereinafter Berlin Mandate].
76. Annex I refers to the countries listed in Annex I to the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
Annex I, opened for signature June 4, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994)
[hereinafter UNFCCC].
77. Berlin Mandate, supra note 75, at 7.
78. Id. at 32–34.
79. Id. See also Emilio L. La Rovere, et al., The Brazilian Proposal on Relative Responsibility for
Global Warming, in BUILDING ON THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: OPTIONS FOR PROTECTING THE CLIMATE
157, 159 (Kevin A. Baumert et al., eds. 2002), available at http://pdf.wri.org/opc_
chapter7.pdf.
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been allowed under the proposal, but only among the developed
countries.80
4.

Contraction and Convergence

The Global Commons Institute has been advocating a per capita
approach in international climate negotiations since 1990, under the
name “Contraction and Convergence.”81 This model has been endorsed
by a number of governmental and non-governmental organizations,
including the European Parliament,82 the United Kingdom’s Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution,83 and India.84
Under the Global Commons Institute’s proposal, emissions quotas
would ultimately be allocated to countries on a per capita basis. But the
developed nations would first be given an adjustment period of several
decades during which time they would reduce their emissions to a
universal per capita level.85 This is the “contraction” phase. Once the
heaviest emitters of CO2 had reduced their emissions levels, the right to
emit carbon would be allocated to countries on a per capita basis.86 This
is the “convergence” phase. The precise rate and magnitude of the two
phases would be worked out through international negotiations.87 Once
the convergence phase began, a global cap-and-trade program would be
established so that nations that were unable to work within their per

80. Berlin Mandate, supra note 75, at 5.
81. See AUBREY MEYER, CONTRACTION & CONVERGENCE: THE GLOBAL SOLUTION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE 19 (2000) (laying out the essence of Contraction & Convergence in three steps).
82. See Resolution on “Winning the Battle Against Global Climate Change,” EUR. PARL. DOC.
(INI 2049) 4 (2005), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&
reference=P6-TA-2005-0433&format=XML&language=EN (“[A] future regime should be based on
common but differentiated responsibilities, aiming at contraction and convergence.”).
83. See ROYAL COMM’N ON ENVTL. POLLUTION, ENERGY—THE CHANGING CLIMATE 3, 28,
(2000), http://www.rcep.org.uk/reports/22-energy/2000-22-summary.pdf.
84. See BROWN, supra note 51, at 213 (describing the argument for equal per capita shares in
greenhouse-gas emissions made by the Indian representative at global warming negotiations in
Geneva in 1991).
85. This universal per capita level would be calculated based on an overall global cap calculated
to stabilize atmospheric CO2 levels at 450 parts per million (ppm). See BROWN, supra note 51, at
213.
86. See MEYER, supra note 81, at 19.
87. The Global Commons Institute has suggested setting a deadline of either 2020 or 2050 for
reaching an equal-shares allotment (“convergence”). See GLOBAL COMMONS INST., GCI BRIEFING:
CONTRACTION AND CONVERGENCE, http://www.gci.org.uk/briefings/ICE.pdf (last visited Mar. 25,
2010) (reproducing Aubrey Meyer, Briefing: Contraction and Convergence, 157 ENGG
SUSTAINABILITY 189, 190 (2004)).
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capita allocations of allowances would be able to purchase additional
emissions allowances from other, more carbon-frugal countries.88
While the second phase of the contraction and convergence model
looks quite similar to a prospective-equal-shares approach, the overall
distribution of costs it would accomplish would look considerably
different. During the transition or “contraction” phase, developed
countries would be allowed to emit significantly more greenhouse gases
than their equal per capita share of emissions and would not be penalized
for those excess emissions by having to buy allowances—as they would
have to do under a prospective-equal-shares approach. In contrast, a
prospective-equal-shares approach would distribute costs on the basis of
equal shares immediately by allocating allowances on a per capita basis
from the outset. This would allow the developed world to transition, not
by letting them off the hook for their share of costs initially, but by
allowing them to buy the right to continue releasing emissions in excess
of their per capita equal share. Thus, by delaying an equal-shares
allocation of costs for several decades, contraction and convergence
would result in a much smaller transfer of money from the developed to
the developing world than would a prospective-equal-shares approach.
C.

Ability-to-Pay Approaches

Another set of approaches bases the allocation of costs on wealth (or
lack thereof). Under these ability-to-pay approaches, allowances are
allocated in inverse proportion to wealth. In this way, the richer
countries, which have more ability to pay, bear more of the costs of
reducing emissions, while poorer countries with little ability to pay, bear
little or no cost.
1.

Inverse Per Capita GDP Multiplied by Population

Perhaps the purest and simplest ability-to-pay approach would use a
formula that multiplied population by the inverse of per capita GDP to
produce an “ability-to-pay score.” Each country would then be allocated
allowances in proportion to their score. Thus, countries with low per
capita GDPs and large populations would get the largest allocation of
allowances and countries with large per capita GDPs and small
populations would get the smallest allocation. Such a formula would
favor the developing world in the distribution of allowances, and like a
per capita approach it would probably require developed countries to pay
88. See MEYER, supra note 81, at 19–20.
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developing countries for the right to emit.89 Indeed, it could well require
an even greater payment from the developed to the developing world
than the per capita approach.
2.

Hybrid Approaches

Often, ability to pay is included as one of several factors in a more
complicated formula.90 The formula might, for example, simply divide
countries into different categories based in part on per capita GDP and
then apply requirements of differing stringencies to different
categories.91 Or it might begin from a baseline of status quo allocations,
but then increase a country’s allocation of allowances if its per capita
GDP falls below a certain level, or increase its allocation by an amount
inverse to per capita GDP.92
III. THREE MODELS OF JUSTICE
If we approach the who-should-pay question from the perspective of
justice rather than efficiency, we can conceptualize the problem in
several different ways. First, we can think of it as a property problem.
We can think of the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere as a
commonly held resource that must be allocated among all people or
countries on earth. Second, we can think of it as a tort problem. One
group of people has engaged in activities that are inflicting harm on
themselves and others, and the problem is how to allocate the costs of
stopping and compensating for those harms. Third, we can think of it as
a kind of tax problem on an international scale. The nations of the world
are engaged in a joint enterprise to promote the common good. The
problem is how to apportion the costs of that enterprise.
The discussion that follows considers each of these models in turn. It
evaluates how each of the three approaches to the who-should-pay
89. See BODANSKY, supra note 44, at 36 (describing a similar approach dubbed “Graduation and
Deepening”).
90. See, e.g., CLINE, supra note 53, at 353 (suggesting a formula that would combine status quo
emissions, GDP, and per capita emissions).
91. See BODANSKY, supra note 44, at 43.
92. See Henry D. Jacoby et al., Toward A Useful Architecture for Climate Change Negotiations
10–12 (MIT Joint Program on the Sci. & Policy of Global Change, Report No. 49, 1999). A
variation on this theme would allocate permits in such a way as to make gross national product
(GNP) costs per capita equivalent to how the costs of supporting the budget of the United Nations
are allocated among countries. See Mustafa J. Babiker & Richard S. Eckaus, Rethinking the Kyoto
Emissions Targets 10 (MIT Joint Program on the Sci. & Politics of Global Change, Report No. 65,
2000).
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question identified in the last Part holds up from a justice perspective.
Overall, the per capita approach fares best: it comports best with the
property and tort models, and it comes in a close second under the tax
model. The status quo approach, on the other hand, fares worst under all
three models.
A.

A Property Model: Apportioning a Common Resource

One way to conceptualize the who-should-pay question is to think of
the capacity of the atmosphere to absorb CO2 and other greenhouse
gases as property. Up until now, we have treated this resource—the
greenhouse-gas-carrying capacity of the atmosphere—as common
property. This made sense when it was thought to be unlimited. Now
that we have come to understand the limits on the capacity of the
atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gases without triggering dangerous
climate change, however, we should treat it as a scarce and finite
resource that must be somehow allocated among the people of the
earth.93
In general, when a group of people takes a resource that was
previously held in common as an undifferentiated whole and then
divides it up among the individual members of the group, the default
assumption is that the resource should be allocated to each individual in
equal shares.94 This default assumption of equal shares is fundamental
and intuitive. When a parent gives a chocolate bar to two children,
generations of children have approached the situation with a timehonored approach that ensures the bar is divided into two equal portions:
“You break it, I choose.” This equality principle is also reflected in the
provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention relating to exploitation of
minerals on the sea floor, which require that revenues from such
exploitation be divided “equitably.”95 And it is reflected in the state of

93. See Grubb, supra note 45, at 483.
94. See H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 163 (1994) (“[E]very distributive
rule begins with some conception of equality . . . .”); Albin, supra note 6, at 124 (“The principle of
equality . . . is partly rooted in the claim of natural law that, by virtue of shared human
characteristics, all people should be treated the same. Any differential treatment must be justified
with a special, legitimate reason.”); id. at 126–27 (The equality principle “converges with common,
intuitive ideas about ‘intrinsic’ or ‘impartial’ justice . . . and enjoys wide acceptability as a basis for
concession-making which produces fair agreements.”).
95. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397,
447.
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Alaska’s distribution of oil revenues from its Permanent Fund in equal
shares to each man, woman, and child in the state.96
Under the equality principle, the default assumption that a common
resource should be divided in equal shares can only be overcome if we
can identify, on the grounds of merit or deservedness, some good reason
to give some people a larger share than others.97 Because commonly
held natural resources are widely viewed as a common heritage, or even
a birthright of humankind, it seems particularly anomalous in this
context to attempt to justify any deviation from equal shares.98
Conceivably, one could try to construct an argument that those who
have already begun to use a disproportionate share of the atmosphere
have built up a reliance interest in their continued ability to do so, and
that those reliance interests should be protected through some version of
adverse possession or squatter’s rights. But those who try to construct
such an argument face steep hurdles.99 Even the doctrine of adverse
possession, which has been well-entrenched in Western property law for
centuries, faces fierce criticism for its perverse moral implications.100
From a deontological perspective, it is ethically problematic to reward
someone for taking more than her fair share of a common resource.
From a consequentialist view, such a rule would create a moral hazard
by incentivizing people generally to appropriate as much of a common
resource to themselves as they can. When resources turn out to be

96. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.025 (1962) (stating that the amount of dividends issued from the
permanent fund is determined by dividing the number of persons eligible for a dividend by the
amount of money available to pay dividends).
97. See BROWN, supra note 51, at 211–12 (“[T]hose who propose criteria for defining equity that
is different than giving all people equal rights to use the atmosphere have the burden of proving that
differences in treatment are based on merit or deservedness of such a kind that should be recognized
by distributive justice.”); YOUNG, supra note 94, at 79–80 (“Equal treatment is an unambiguous and
desirable ideal when everyone is similarly situated . . . . When they differ—in contribution, need,
ability, or blame—equal treatment is not appropriate.”).
98. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397,
398 (“[T]he area of the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are the common heritage of mankind.”).
99. See Grubb, supra note 45, at 487 (noting that hurdles include the approach’s disputable
ethical acceptability, the absence of a common law sanction for pollution rights, and the problems of
constructing an emissions baseline that counterfactually discounts any abatement efforts).
100. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79
NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1145–53 (1985) (arguing that whether an adverse possessor is acting in good
faith or bad faith should be relevant to law of adverse possession to avoid rewarding those acting in
bad faith and arguing that bad faith adverse possessors should be forced to indemnify true owners);
Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2434 (2001)
(“There must be times when poor, unsuspecting, innocent owners lose all or part of their land
without having done anything wrong.”).
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limited, such incentives drive the tragedy of the commons. That seems a
bad precedent to set in an age in which we are continually discovering
the limits of the carrying capacities of the various natural resources on
which we collectively rely.
This property model, then, seems clearly to support a per capita
approach to the who-should-pay question that would ground a country’s
allocation of emission allowances on the principle that we should
distribute to each individual on the planet an equal share in the
absorptive capacity of the atmosphere.101 Whether this model leads to a
prospective-equal-shares approach or a historical-equal-shares approach
depends on how the property resource is defined. Defining it as the
remaining absorptive capacity of the atmosphere from this point forward
would lead to a prospective-equal-shares approach. Defining it as the
total capacity the atmosphere has ever had available to absorb nonnaturally-occurring greenhouse-gas emissions would lead to a historicalequal-shares approach in conjunction with a prospective-equal-shares
approach.
Even though the property model seems clearly to point toward a per
capita approach, because the equality principle has such widespread and
intuitive appeal, status quo approaches are also frequently defended
through appeals to the equality principle. President George W. Bush, for
example, argued that an international climate treaty that demanded
similar percentage reductions from developed and developing countries
alike would be “even-handed.”102 In a similar vein, Eric Posner and Cass
Sunstein have argued that “[a] [globally] uniform greenhouse gas tax has
a great deal to recommend it . . . nations and their citizens will in an
important sense be treated the same.”103
On a superficial level, a status quo approach may seem to comport
with the principle of equality. It does, after all, require an equal
101. See AGARWAL & NARAIN, supra note 66, at 4; BARRY, supra note 62, at 267–69; BROWN,
supra note 51, at 213–15; MEYER, supra note 81, at 19; SINGER, supra note 64, at 43; Discussion
Paper from Climate Action Network to COP9 at Milan, Italy, A Viable Global Framework for
Preventing Dangerous Climate Change 2 (Dec. 2003), http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/newzealand/press/reports/clean-coal-technology-briefing/a-viable-global-framework-for.pdf
[hereinafter Climate Action Network]. This approach also comports with the arrangement that
agents behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance would likely choose. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 118–23 (Rev. ed., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1999).
102. See SINGER, supra note 64, at 26 (quoting Bush’s statement in the second of the three
televised debates during the 2000 campaign).
103. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice 33 (John M. Olin Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 354, 2007), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/
files/354.pdf. See also Albin, supra note 6, at 126 (describing proposals in international negotiations
of equal-percentage reductions of acid rain that were defended under the equality principle).
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percentage of emissions reductions from each country. But such an
arrangement arbitrarily anoints the status quo emissions pattern as a
legitimate baseline, and thus in reality only superimposes a veneer of
equal treatment on an otherwise vastly unequal situation.104 The
percentage reduction being demanded of each country is equal, but the
amounts being emitted by each country to begin with vary wildly,
especially in per capita terms. Requiring equal-percentage reductions
might, for example, allow an American who has been emitting twenty
tons of greenhouse gases each year to continue to emit sixteen tons per
year, while asking an Indian who has been emitting only 1.2 tons per
year to ratchet her emissions down to 0.96 tons.105 Or, as Peter Singer
puts it, “if, to meet the limits set for the United States, taxes or other
disincentives are used that go no further than providing incentives for
Americans to drive more fuel-efficient cars, it would not be right to set
limits on China that prevent the Chinese from driving cars at all.”106
Finally, the ability-to-pay approach probably comes in second under a
property model. It is not as neat a fit with the equality principle as the
per capita approach, but it can be defended. The best defense of the
ability-to-pay approach under a property model would probably take the
form of an argument that the equality principle allows for a deviation
from equal shares on the basis of wealth. Such an argument might at
least be easier to defend than the argument that the equality principle
would allow deviation from equal shares on the basis of status quo
emissions. One might argue that those who have less wealth generally
should get a larger allocation of the atmospheric resource—that this
resource should be allocated in a way that makes up, at least in part, for
past inequities in the distribution of wealth in general. Such an
arrangement could certainly be justified on utilitarian grounds. Because
a dollar is generally worth more to a poor person than a rich person,
utilitarians often favor redistribution from the rich to the poor because it
increases aggregate social welfare.107 Such an arrangement might also be
defended on Rawlsian grounds. Rawls’s “difference principle” allows
inequalities in the distribution of goods only if those inequalities benefit
104. See Albin, supra note 6, at 127 (“A closer examination reveals that [an equal-percentagereduction approach] establishes justice and fairness only in a very restricted sense.”); Grubb, supra
note 45, at 487 (arguing that status quo approach violates all sorts of ethical principles, and asserting
that no one advocates it on ethical grounds, but only on practical grounds).
105. See U.N. STATISTICS DIV., U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFF., CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS
(CO2), METRIC TONS OF CO2 PER CAPITA, http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?
srid=751&crid= (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
106. SINGER, supra note 64, at 38.
107. Posner & Sunstein, Justice, supra note 37, at 1571.
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the worst-off members of society.108 But arguments for generalized
wealth redistribution also face significant obstacles, not the least of
which is the well-worn objection that too much wealth redistribution
erodes incentives for hard work.
Without delving further into such arguments, it is fair to say that
examining the who-should-pay question under a property model leads to
application of the equality principle, and that this analysis of the
question strongly supports a per capita approach. An ability-to-pay
approach comes in second, and a status quo approach comes in a distant
third.
B.

A Tort Model: Allocating the Costs of Harmful Activities

Alternatively, we can think of climate change as a tort problem—as a
question of how to allocate costs when one party causes injury to
another. The principle that animates tort law in legal systems around the
world—that when one person causes harm to another, she should pay to
remedy it—is fundamental and broadly shared among virtually all
religions and ethical systems.109 It is captured in the common adage:
“You broke it, you fix it.”110
This principle is also embodied in international law. It is reflected in
the oft-cited “polluter pays”111 principle, which was memorialized in
Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration:
National authorities should endeavour to promote the
internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic
instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter
should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard
to the public interest and without distorting international trade
and investment.112
It is also incorporated in the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change, under which the developed nations agreed to:
108. See RAWLS, supra note 101, at 65–70.
109. See Natalia M. Bartels & M. Stuart Madden, A Comparative Analysis of United States and
Colombian Tort Law: Duty, Breach, and Damages, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 59, 60 (2001); Saul
Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety And Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law,
61 TUL. L. REV. 235, 243–45 (1986).
110. See Henry Shue, Global Environment and International Inequality, 75 INT’L AFF. 531, 533
(1999) (“All over the world, parents teach their children to clean up their own mess.”).
111. As Michael Grubb points out, the polluter pays principle does not tell us exactly how much
the polluter should pay. See Grubb, supra note 45, at 490.
112. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3–14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (emphasis added).
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[P]rotect the climate system . . . on the basis of equity and in
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country
Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and
the adverse effects thereof.113
And it is reflected in the general principle of international law that
one country should not allow activities within its borders to interfere
with activities within another sovereign state’s borders.114
Tort law is typically justified on both consequentialist grounds, as
deterring harmful behavior, and deontological grounds, as embodying
norms of corrective justice.115 The point here is not to apply the doctrine
of tort law literally to see whether climate change victims would actually
win if they brought a lawsuit against emitters of greenhouse gases,
though a number of such suits are currently making their way through
the U.S. courts.116 Tort law does not directly apply to the international
negotiations on climate change. Rather, we look to tort law to see if it
offers any general insights into broadly shared notions of fairness and
justice that might prove useful in thinking about how a fair and just
international agreement might allocate the costs of climate change
among countries. Looking at the who-should-pay question through a tort
law lens raises a number of complex issues. They cluster roughly in

113. UNFCCC, supra note 76, at art. 3, para. 1 (emphasis added). It also states that the developed
countries “shall . . . assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the
adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.” Id. at art.
4, para. 4.
114. See Jutta Brunnée, The United States and International Environmental Law: Living with an
Elephant, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 617, 628 (2004) (“The genesis of one of the cornerstone principles of
international environmental law, the prohibition against causation of significant transboundary
environmental harm, is closely linked to the United States. One of the sources to which this
principle is typically traced back is the arbitral award in the Trail Smelter case, which arose between
the United States and Canada in the early part of the 20th century.”) (footnote omitted); Climate
Action Network, supra note 101, at 3.
115. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 260–61 (1996);
Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 449 (1992); Benjamin
C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 699–700 (2003) (“Corrective
justice theory explains tort law as the embodiment of a deontological . . . set of values.”) (footnote
omitted).
116. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009) (Gulf Coast owners
bringing putative class action against oil and energy companies for their contributions to global
warming that added to the ferocity of Hurricane Katrina); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582
F.3d 309 (2d. Cir. 2009) (states and nonprofits suing electric utilities for abatement of public
nuisance related to global warming); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d
863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (Native Alaskan village suing gas company alleging contributions to global
warming that are speeding erosion of traditional land).
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three groups: 1) culpability issues, 2) causation issues, and 3) remedy
issues.
1.

Culpability

Tort law typically—though not always—requires the plaintiff to show
some level of culpability or fault on the part of the defendant.117 This is
often viewed as an important element of the corrective justice goal of
tort law: holding wrongdoers accountable. Are greenhouse-gas emitters
culpable? While no one emits greenhouse gases with the intent to cause
harm, such activity might be negligent, at least if it took place after the
point at which a reasonable person should have known of the dangers of
global warming.118 Those corporate actors who engaged in a deliberate
campaign to mislead the public and policymakers about the science of
global warming might arguably meet an even higher standard of
culpability.119
The concept of negligence is, of course, rooted in the notion of
reasonableness—the reasonable person standard.120 And defining what is
reasonable in the context of climate change is bound to create
controversy. First, there is the issue of knowledge. The reasonable
person standard is usually construed to incorporate a requirement of
objective knowledge.121 That is, we typically hold a tort defendant liable
only for actions that a reasonable person would have known might cause
injury.122 Thus, it would be difficult to argue that those who emitted
greenhouse gases before sometime in the early 1990s, when knowledge

117. See Perry, supra note 115, at 496–500; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965).
118. See Daniel A. Farber, Apportioning Climate Change Costs, 26 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 21, 31 (2007–2008) [hereinafter Farber, Apportioning]. But see Matthew D. Adler,
Corrective Justice and Liability for Global Warming, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1862 (2007)
(arguing that negligence on the part of greenhouse-gas emitters would be hard to show). Plenty of
scientific uncertainty remains regarding the extent to which specific effects will be triggered by
global warming. But for our purposes here—evaluating how costs might be shared among nations in
an international treaty, rather than awarding damages to a particular plaintiff in a lawsuit—it seems
unnecessary to show that the emitters had reason to know their emissions would lead to some
particular effect (like the damage to coral reefs in Australia). Knowledge that emissions would lead
to global warming which would produce harmful effects seems sufficient to support culpability for
this purpose. Cf. id. at 1861–62.
119. See Farber, Apportioning, supra note 118, at 31.
120. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 cmt. a (2001).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965).
122. Id.
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of the phenomenon of global warming became widespread, were acting
negligently.123
Some might argue that even emissions after the 1990s do not rise to
the level of negligence because, in light of local community standards,
these actions were reasonable.124 One might contend that the countless
normal day-to-day activities that virtually every citizen of the developed
world has engaged in for decades—from driving a car to heating one’s
house—cannot possibly be unreasonable. A set of activities that virtually
every person in the community is regularly engaged in cannot be said to
violate the reasonable person standard—particularly when the
government allows, and in some cases even condones, those activities. A
similar argument might be made on behalf of the companies that were
supplying the oil, coal, and electricity to all those reasonable
consumers—often with the approval and outright encouragement of
government.125
But the Second Restatement of Torts actually specifies that, while
community customs are “factors to be taken into account” in
determining whether conduct is negligent, they are “not controlling
where a reasonable man would not follow them.”126 In any event, it is
not at all clear that it is appropriate to judge the reasonableness of the
wrongdoer’s actions by the standards of a community that excludes
many of the victims. While the day-to-day activities that have led to
warming may seem reasonable in the developed world, to a person in
Bangladesh who lives without a car and without electricity, they may
seem unreasonable. Once we expand the community-standards lens to an
international scope, it is difficult to view as reasonable actions taken in
order to achieve incremental, non-needs-related consumption gains with
the knowledge that they will cause serious harms, including death to
others.127

123. See Farber, Apportioning, supra note 118, at 32 (suggesting 1992 as a cut-off date for
apportioning responsibility for climate change adaptation according to a polluter pays principle);
Heinzerling, supra note 74, at 455–57 (arguing that scientific consensus on climate change became
clear in the late 1980s or early 1990s).
124. E.g., Breault v. Ford Motor Co., 305 N.E.2d 824, 828 (Mass. 1973) (“If one does what
others do in like circumstances, the inference that he is conforming to the community standard of
reasonable conduct may be so strong in particular circumstances as to establish that the individual
was not negligent.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A.
125. See The Best Bill Corporations Could Buy: A Summary of Industry Giveaways in the 2005
Energy Bill, PUBLIC CITIZEN, Aug. 2005, http://www.citizen.org/documents/aug2005ebsum.pdf.
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A.
127. See Christian Azar & Thomas Sterner, Discounting and Distributional Considerations in the
Context of Global Warming, 19 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 169, 170 (1996).
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It seems particularly difficult to make the case for reasonableness
when we consider that many of the emissions in the developed world
over the past two decades could easily have been prevented—in many
instances at a net cost savings—by simply implementing known
technologies to improve energy efficiency. In many more instances,
prevention could have been achieved by incurring a modest increase in
cost or a modest decrease in convenience. Indeed, under standard
economic understandings of tort law, if the marginal costs of measures
to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions are lower than the marginal benefits
that would accrue in the form of decreased climate-change harms, then
the failure to implement such reductions is, by definition,
unreasonable.128
Even if some emissions are unreasonable, however, not all emissions
are necessarily equally unreasonable. Henry Shue argues, for example,
that we should distinguish between subsistence emissions and luxury
emissions.129 Dan Farber argues that emitters should be held liable not
for all their emissions, but only their “excess” emissions—that is, those
emissions that exceed some threshold of reasonableness or optimality.130
A similar notion animates the argument that compliance with domestic
or international greenhouse-gas regulations should shield an emitter
from culpability for climate-change harms.131 Perhaps a state, like the
Netherlands, for example, that is in full compliance with its obligations
under the Kyoto Protocol, should not be held responsible for climate
change damages to the same degree as a state like the United States.132 It
128. See Michael Faure & André Nollkaemper, International Liability as an Instrument to
Prevent and Compensate for Climate Change, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 151 (2007). This is in
essence simply a restatement of the famous Learned Hand Formula. See United States v. Carroll
Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d. Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (“[T]he owner’s duty . . . to provide against
resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability . . .; (2) the gravity of the
resulting injury . . .; [and] (3) the burden of adequate precautions.”).
129. See Shue, supra note 60, at 449, 455 (arguing that each individual should be entitled to the
minimum share of emissions rights necessary to survival and that this minimum share should be
non-tradable: “A society in which food is available only for payment is a brutal and uncivilized
place. What is suggested here is merely the equivalent of food stamps on the global level for vital
emissions.”).
130. See Farber, Apportioning, supra note 118, at 40 (“Using excess emissions as the basis for
liability is more closely linked with culpability. Emitters have some kind of responsibility for all of
the harms caused by their emissions, but they seem most to blame for harms that they should have
avoided through prudent mitigation measures.”).
131. See Faure & Nollkaemper, supra note 128, at 151.
132. Id. at 152 (arguing that there is “little or no evidence” that the parties to the Kyoto Protocol
intended it to replace customary international law regarding liability for transboundary
environmental harms). This may be a moot point in any case because Kyoto is about to expire with
no subsequent agreement to take its place. An economic approach to tort law usually argues against
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certainly seems reasonable that emissions below a certain level should
be shielded from liability—that an Indian who pedals a rickshaw for a
living should not be held liable for his small amount of emissions at the
same rate as an American who drives an SUV. The difficulty comes in
defining the level at which emissions are deemed “reasonable.”133 As I
argue below, a per capita allocation of an agreed-upon cap offers a
simple and appealing benchmark.
Even in the absence of knowledge or culpability, tort law sometimes
imposes liability under the doctrine of strict liability.134 Many
jurisdictions impose strict liability for ultrahazardous activities.135 The
Superfund statute is another prominent example of this approach.136
Indeed, the deterrence rationale for tort law arguably justifies imposing
liability even in some situations where the defendants are ignorant of the
harms that may flow from their conduct. For example, imposing
retroactive liability on a chemical manufacturer for harms caused by its
chemicals before those chemicals were proven harmful can be defended
on the ground that it will create incentives for such companies to go to
extra lengths to seek out information on the toxicity of their chemicals in
the future.137

treating compliance with regulatory standards as a shield from liability, because it cannot be
assumed that regulatory standards are set efficiently. Accordingly, imposing liability regardless of
regulatory compliance gives a polluter incentive to take additional precautions over and above what
regulatory standards might require. See Paul Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability
for the Control of External Costs, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 227, 236–39 (1999); Susan RoseAckerman, Public Law Versus Private Law in Environmental Regulation: European Union
Proposals in the Light of United States and German Experiences, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 13, 22–23 (Erling Eide & Roger Vanden Bergh eds., 1996); Steven Shavell,
Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 365–71 (1984).
133. See Farber, Apportioning, supra note 118, at 41.
134. But even in strict liability, there is usually some element of wrongfulness in the defendant’s
conduct. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 822, 942 (2000); see also Stephen R. Perry, The
Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 147, 154–59 (1988)
(discussing a theory of strict liability based on the notion that a defendant should not be permitted to
reap the benefits of his activity while forcing its costs upon someone else).
135. See Faure & Nollkaemper, supra note 128, at 150. Under American law, however, the type
of activity that warrants imposition of strict liability is often described as “abnormally dangerous.”
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20(a) (2001) (“A defendant who carries on an abnormally
dangerous activity is subject to strict liability for physical harm resulting from the activity.”). The
requirement that the activity must be “abnormal” might be hard to meet in the context of
greenhouse-gas emissions.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006) (imposing strict liability on any person who disposed of or
arranged to dispose of hazardous substances that are subsequently released into the environment).
137. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 511, 551–
52 (1986).
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Furthermore, even intuitive notions of corrective justice may not
necessarily require culpability in order to impose liability. “You broke it,
you fix it” does not, after all, require that you knew you might break it.
In Henry Shue’s view, those who argue that liability for climate-change
harms requires knowledge on the part of the emitters of the potential
harms confuse punishment and responsibility.138 As a matter of intuitive
fairness, it is perfectly reasonable to hold people responsible for harms
they caused, even when they were unforeseeable and unavoidable, rather
than allowing the burden to fall on blameless victims.139
In sum, a credible argument can be made that culpability should not
be required in order to hold greenhouse-gas emitters responsible for the
costs of climate change—that those who are responsible for emitting
greenhouse gases should be held strictly liable for the harms they cause.
But even if a negligence standard is appropriate, a strong argument can
be made that those who emitted greenhouse gases after some point in the
early 1990s are sufficiently culpable, at least with respect to those
emissions that exceed some specified threshold of reasonableness. Part
III.B.3 argues that such a threshold should be set at a per capita share of
an agreed-upon global emissions cap.
2.

Causation

Tort law also requires a causal link between the actor’s conduct and
the victim’s injury. In a lawsuit in which particular plaintiffs seek to
hold particular defendants liable, proving causation raises a host of
difficulties. While the general link between greenhouse-gas emissions
and increases in average global temperature is by now well
established,140 the causal link between a particular defendant’s emissions
and a particular plaintiff’s injury can be difficult to fit within the
traditional legal framework of but-for causation.141
First, the causal link between any individual entity’s emissions of
greenhouse gases and the accumulation of dangerous levels of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere can be difficult to establish. The
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is characterized by
138. Shue, supra note 110, at 535.
139. Id.
140. See Alley et al., supra note 71, at 5; Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate
Change, SCI., Dec. 3, 2004, at 1686, 1686 (“In recent years, all major scientific bodies in the United
States whose members’ expertise bears directly on the matter have . . . all issued statements
concluding that the evidence for human modification of climate is compelling.”).
141. Michael Duffy, Climate Change Causation: Harmonizing Tort Law and Scientific
Probability, 28 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. REV. 185, 219–21 (2010).
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the “bathtub effect.” CO2 is continuously being added to the atmosphere,
but it is also continuously being removed from the atmosphere as plants,
trees, and algae absorb CO2 through photosynthesis. The problem is that
CO2 is currently being added to the atmosphere at about twice the rate
that it is being removed. Thus, we can imagine the atmosphere as a
bathtub with the tap on full blast and a slow drain, so that the water is
gushing in twice as fast as it is draining out. Accordingly, we cannot say
that every molecule of CO2 released into the atmosphere necessarily
causes harm. Some molecules make their way down the “drain”—they
are simply absorbed back into the forests and oceans as part of the
earth’s natural carbon cycle. Because no one entity’s emissions would be
enough on their own to cause the bathtub to overflow, it is difficult to
say that, but for an individual’s emissions of CO2, a climate-change
injury would not have occurred.142
Second, establishing a but-for causal link between increases in
average global temperature and any particular climate-change impact
can be problematic as well. Impacts that are themselves continuing
trends that result directly from rising temperatures pose less of a
problem—rising sea levels or melting arctic ice, for example. But
linking discrete weather events, like heat waves, droughts, and
hurricanes, to global warming is more difficult. Even though the
evidence linking global warming to overall trends in such weather events
is very well-established, definitively attributing any particular such event
to global warming is challenging. Such causal links can be established, if
at all, only in probabilistic terms.143

142. Some philosophers have characterized this as a “moral collective action problem.” Adler,
supra note 118, at 1862–63; Jamieson, supra note 3, at 293. But see Carl Cranor, Collective and
Individual Duties to Address Global Warming, in ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE
CHANGE POLICY, supra note 5, at 153 (arguing for collective moral duties); Jonathan Glover & M.
Scott-Taggart, “It Makes No Difference Whether or Not I Do It,” 49 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELEAN
SOC’Y 171, 174 (1975) (arguing for a “Principle of Divisibility,” which “says that, in cases where
harm is a matter of degree, subthreshold actions are wrong to the extent that they cause harm, and
where a hundred acts like mine are necessary to cause a detectable difference I have caused 1/100 of
that detectable harm”).
143. For example, a recent study published in Nature concludes that it is very likely (confidence
level > 90%) that human influence at least doubled the risk of a heat wave of the magnitude of the
2003 European heat wave. Peter A. Stott, D.A. Stone & M.R. Allen, Human Contribution to the
European Heatwave of 2003, 432 NATURE 610 (2004) (“It is an ill-posed question whether the 2003
heatwave was caused, in a simple deterministic sense, by a modification of the external influences
on climate—for example, increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere—
because almost any such weather event might have occurred by chance in an unmodified climate.
However, it is possible to estimate by how much human activities may have increased the risk of the
occurrence of such a heatwave.”).
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Finally, because of feedback loops144 and other factors, the
relationship of accumulations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to
overall warming and to other climate change impacts is not linear. One
particular molecule of CO2 might be the straw that breaks the camel’s
back, triggering a feedback loop that dramatically increases the pace of
warming. To the extent that climate change takes this kind of non-linear
form, it may not be appropriate to assume that each molecule (or ton) of
CO2 has the same level of impact. It might be appropriate, as Dan Farber
has suggested, to hold emitters liable not for the average effect of all
molecules of CO2 emitted by everyone, but for the marginal effect of
each molecule or unit of CO2.145
All of this is to say that calculating the precise amount of damage
caused by a particular molecule or ton of CO2 released by a particular
entity at a particular time is enormously challenging. Nonetheless, tort
law may well evolve to adapt to these challenges. Even before climate
change became a subject of tort suits, scholars had begun to recognize
that formalistic concepts of but-for causation were outmoded in an age
in which science had long ago evolved beyond the kind of definitive,
mechanistic terms that Newtonian physics used to describe the
movement of physical objects through space, and that the legal system
needed to develop doctrines capable of incorporating contemporary
scientific notions of probabilistic causation.146 And during the last
several decades, that evolution has already begun to occur; courts have
employed concepts of proportional liability in cases involving harmful
medications,147 environmental toxins,148 the contamination of common

144. The term “feedback loop” refers to a phenomenon in which processes interact such that a
change in one process works to either reinforce another process (positive feedback) or suppress it
(negative feedback). For example, an increase in global temperature causes snow and ice to melt,
which reduces the reflectivity of the earth’s surface and thereby increases solar absorption, which in
turn further raises temperatures, and so on. As a result of this feedback loop, the IPCC has explained
that “[a]nthropogenic warming and sea level rise would continue for centuries due to the timescales
associated with climate processes and feedbacks, even if greenhouse gas concentrations were to be
stabilized.” Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment on Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 71, at 16.
145. See Farber, Apportioning, supra note 118, at 42–44.
146. See Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific
Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 478–91 (1988); Eduardo
M. Peñalver, Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort Principles to the Problem of Climate
Change, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563, 582–85 (1998).
147. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
148. See In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1127, 1133–37 (9th Cir.
2002); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).

SindenDTPed.doc (Do Not Delete)

332

5/17/2010 10:17 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:293

pool resources,149 and elsewhere. It is not impossible to imagine courts
resolving some of the causation dilemmas raised by climate change by
adopting a proportional-liability approach under which, for example,
defendants pay for a plaintiff’s climate-change damages in proportion to
their contribution of greenhouse gases to the overall accumulation in the
atmosphere and in proportion to the probability that climate change
caused the particular weather event that resulted in the plaintiff’s
injury.150
Here, however, where we seek guidance only for international
negotiations, it is not as crucial that we establish causal links between
individual emitters and individual victims with the same precision that
might be required in a tort lawsuit. Accordingly, we need not consider
these issues in depth. Here the relevant entities are countries, or perhaps
even groups of countries, not individual persons or corporations. Thus,
the conundrums associated with establishing the causal link between
individual emissions and accumulations of heat-trapping gases in the
atmosphere are significantly obviated.151 Moreover, we are not
concerned with tracing causal responsibility for some particular harm
suffered by particular individuals, or even for some particular weather
event. Rather, we are concerned with allocating the aggregate costs of
climate change to the globe as a whole. Thus, the difficulties associated
with tracing a causal link from increases in average global temperatures
to particular weather events do not arise in this context.
In the realm of international negotiations, then, it seems reasonable to
say that the developed countries have each contributed significantly to
causing the climate change problem. It also seems fair to say that they
should be treated as culpable for their post-1990 emissions that exceed

149. See, e.g., Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., 495 F.2d 213, 216, 218 (6th Cir. 1974)
(operating joint and several liability on three corporations for injuries caused by air pollution); In re
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (in suit
for harm caused by MTBE released into groundwater by multiple defendants, holding each
defendant severally liable in proportion to its share of the market at the time the risk of harm to
plaintiffs was created: “[a plaintiff] should be able to recover damages from any defendant that
contributed to the harm, even if a defendant was not responsible for all of it”); City of Tulsa v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1300 (N.D. Okla. 2003) (applying doctrine of concurrent
wrongdoing to negligence claim against seven defendants for pollution of lake); Union Tex.
Petroleum Corp. v. Texas, 909 P. 2d 131, 150 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995) (applying doctrine to claim
for saltwater contamination of aquifer by two oil companies).
150. See Duffy, supra note 141, at 222.
151. See Adler, supra note 118, at 1866 (suggesting that looking at climate change liability in
terms of countries or governments, rather than individuals, may obviate the moral collective action
problem).
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some threshold of reasonableness. But how do we translate these general
principles into a specific formula for cost sharing?
3.

Remedy

This is, in essence, the question of remedy. Returning to the analogy
of a tort lawsuit, we might imagine that the appropriate remedy would
take two forms. First, for those injuries that have already occurred or
become inevitable due to the greenhouse gases already accumulated in
the atmosphere, the emitters would be liable for money damages. These
damages would include both adaptation costs and compensation for
those effects to which adaptation is impossible. Second, because so
much of the injury that will occur due to climate change can be
characterized as irreparable and will not be adequately remedied by
money damages, the emitters would also incur a duty to reduce future
emissions.152 That is, in a lawsuit they would be subject to an
injunction.153 But how would such an injunction be tailored? To what
level would it require emitters to reduce? Recall that, assuming a
culpability approach, emitters would not be held liable for all their
emissions, but only for those that exceed some threshold of
reasonableness.154 The injunction, then, would require emitters to reduce
their emissions to “reasonable” levels. This would require them to pay
for whatever new technologies or other measures would be necessary to
accomplish such reductions. In the parlance of climate change, these are
mitigation costs. The next section considers how those costs might be
calculated, how the notion of “reasonable” emissions levels might be
defined, and how well each of the three approaches to the who-shouldpay question (status quo, per capita, and ability-to-pay) comports with
this model of fairness.

152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 933 cmt. a (1965) (The availability of an
injunction as a remedy in a tort case “has traditionally been stated in terms of the ‘inadequacy of the
remedy at law,’ ‘inadequacy of damages,’ and ‘irreparable injury.’”); see also id. §§ 936, 938 cmt.
b.
153. See Faure & Nollkaemper, supra note 128, at 174 (asserting that under international law, the
remedy in an action by one state against another for liability for climate change harms would
include both monetary damages for past harms and imposition of a duty to mitigate to prevent future
harm); id. at 175 (noting that European Directive 2004/35/CE on environmental liability takes a
similar approach of providing for liability for the costs of both preventive and remedial action).
154. See supra Part III.B.1.
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“Injunctive Relief”: Mitigation Costs

Calculating the mitigation costs for which a particular country should
be responsible first requires pinpointing that country’s reasonable
emissions level. Let us begin by imagining that the international
community could agree on an appropriate series of annual global caps on
greenhouse-gas emissions that would, for example, stabilize emissions
by mid-century at a level likely to avoid catastrophic harm. From there,
we can derive each individual’s reasonable emissions level by simply
applying the Golden Rule. In order to “do unto others as you would have
others do unto you,” each individual would want to keep her emissions
at or below the maximum amount which, if matched by every individual
on earth, would not exceed reasonable levels—i.e., the global cap. Thus,
the individual reasonable emissions level is simply a per capita share of
that overall cap. An individual who kept her emissions within this limit
could reasonably say that she had not caused harm—if harm is defined
as exceeding the global cap.
Thus, the imaginary injunction described above would require each
individual on earth to ensure that her emissions were at or below a per
capita share of the global cap. Alternatively, it would require each
country to reduce its emissions to the per capita share of the cap times its
population.
As a practical matter, most developed countries probably would not
be able to immediately reduce their own emissions to the per capita
level. Initially, it would make more sense for them to offset at least some
of their excess emissions by paying developing countries for extra
emissions rights. Assuming a global cap-and-trade program, they would
do this by buying allowances from developing countries whose
emissions, at least initially, would likely be below their reasonable
emissions level and who would accordingly have extra allowances to
sell. As discussed above, this approach also has the advantage of being
less costly overall because reductions are generally cheaper in the
developing world.155
Accordingly, under a tort theory, each (developed) country’s share of
mitigation costs should be the cost of implementing reductions anywhere
in the world or buying emissions rights equivalent to the amount of
155. See supra Part I.A. Because under a per capita approach, developing countries might, in the
early years at least, receive allocations of allowances larger than their existing emissions, purchases
of allowances by developed countries in those early years might not directly represent immediate
emissions reductions. Assuming a steadily decreasing cap and a program that allowed banking of
allowances, however, such early purchases by developed countries of “excess” allowances from
developing countries would represent a reduction in the overall future emissions trajectory.
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reduction that would be necessary to bring the country’s emissions
below its per capita share of the global cap. In other words, assuming a
trading scheme, this is the amount of money a developed country would
have to pay to reduce emissions and/or purchase allowances from other
countries under a per capita allocation of allowances.
Under this line of reasoning, at least with respect to mitigation costs,
the tort theory seems to lead to the same place the property theory led: to
a cap-and-trade system with a per capita allocation of allowances. In
particular, a tort theory suggests an allocation of mitigation costs that
tracks a prospective-equal-shares approach to the allocation of
allowances under a global cap-and-trade program.
A status quo approach, in contrast, is a very poor fit for allocating
mitigation damages under the tort model. The status quo approach fails
to serve both the corrective justice and deterrence goals of tort. Because
it demands equal percentage reductions from all, it fails to differentiate
between those whose emissions exceed a threshold of reasonableness
and are therefore culpable for causing climate change, and those whose
emissions remain below that threshold and who therefore bear no
responsibility.
An ability-to-pay approach would comport with a tort model for
allocating mitigation costs in a very general sense to the extent that
emissions roughly track GDP. Thus, those countries with high per capita
GDP would get the smallest allocation of allowances and thus bear the
largest share of the costs under an ability-to-pay approach. These
countries are also by and large those with the highest per capita carbon
emissions who would bear the largest share of mitigation costs under a
tort model. But the fit is not perfect. Some countries with relatively high
GDP have been able to keep emissions low by instituting energy taxes or
using other means to encourage the use of alternative technologies.156
But under an ability-to-pay approach, such countries would get no
reward for good behavior. They would be responsible for just as big a
share of mitigation costs as those that had taken no steps to reduce
emissions.
In this way, an ability-to-pay approach misaligns the incentives. If
anything, it produces an incentive not to increase GDP. Such an
incentive is undoubtedly outweighed by the numerous other strong
156. Sweden, for example, has made impressive strides with its carbon tax, reducing CO2
emissions by 9% between 1990 and 2006, exceeding its target under the Kyoto Protocol, while
enjoying booming economic growth of 44%. Gwladys Fouché, Sweden’s Carbon-Tax Solution to
Climate Change Puts It Top of the Green List, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2008),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/apr/29/climatechange.carbonemissions.
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incentives favoring economic growth, and countries would most likely
continue efforts to boost GDP. But, by using GDP as its only criterion,
the ability-to-pay approach fails to create any incentive to try to keep
emissions low while raising GDP. Accordingly, it undermines the
deterrence goal of tort law.
In sum, the ability-to-pay approach weakly serves the goals of
corrective justice to the extent that GDP roughly tracks emissions. But
conceptually, it is untethered from corrective justice, because ability to
pay has no direct relationship to culpability, which is the touchstone of
corrective justice.
b.

“Damages Relief”: Adaptation and Compensation Costs

Deriving a formula for adaptation and compensatory damages
presents even more complications than doing so for mitigation damages.
First, unlike a typical tort suit, in which damages are purely
retrospective, the damages in this context must be both retrospective and
prospective. Because there is a significant lag time—decades or even
centuries—between when greenhouse gases accumulate in the
atmosphere and when the earth’s temperature warms in response to the
change, some of the harms from climate change that have already been
set in motion by past emissions will not be felt for many years.157
Accordingly, those responsible for unreasonable emissions owe the
victims of climate change adaptation costs and compensation not only
for impacts that have already occurred, but also for harms that have
already become inevitable because of past emissions but have not yet
occurred.
A second set of complications arises because actually calculating
these damages—even on the scale of countries—would require
confronting some of the sticky causation issues described above. In
order to determine exactly how much a particular country is owed in
adaptation costs and compensation, one would have to be able to
establish a causal link between climate change and particular events. But
as noted above, proving that any particular drought, storm, flood, crop
failure, or disease outbreak was caused by climate change is difficult.
When such a link can be established at all, it is usually in probabilistic
terms. Even assuming one could clear that hurdle, it would be necessary
to then quantify and monetize all of the particular harms caused by each
such event. Given the diverse array of harms, including such intangibles
as loss of human life and health, destruction of communities and
157. See Alley et al., supra note 71, at 17.
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cultures, extinction of species, and disruption of ecosystems, such an
assessment would be difficult and controversial in any case.158 But in
this context, the problem would be made even worse by the fact that
most of the impacts of climate change—even those that have already
been made inevitable by past emissions—have yet to occur. We cannot
accurately predict exactly what those impacts will be, where they will
occur, whom they will harm, or whether various adaptation efforts will
succeed or fail. Should attempts be made now to estimate future
damages,159 or should some system be set up for victims to periodically
apply for damages in the future?160
Under any approach, an exact calculation of adaptation and
compensation costs would be, at best, difficult and controversial, and
probably impossible. Indeed, given the multiple dimensions of
uncertainty involved, it is not at all clear that an attempt to calculate such
damages directly would be worth the effort. A better method might be to
find some proxy that would offer a rough approximation of adaptation
and compensation costs.161
In light of that reality, a historical-equal-shares approach with a start
date in the early 1990s might offer an attractive second-best solution.
While it would not attempt to calculate the actual damages to be incurred
by victims of climate change, it would offer a powerful symbolic link to
the genesis of the problem, and in that way would support both the
corrective justice and deterrence goals of tort law.
If we were to go back in time and take historical emissions into
account in allocating emissions allowances for a cap-and-trade scheme,
we would be essentially penalizing developed countries for their past
emissions, requiring them to buy even more allowances from the

158. Such valuations in the context of cost-benefit analysis have received harsh criticism. See,
e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 23, at 39–40. See infra notes 182–88 and
accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement, 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (granting permanent
damages in plaintiffs’ favor for ongoing damages caused by nearby cement plant, but denying a
permanent injunction).
160. See Farber, Apportioning, supra note 118, at 46–47.
161. See id. at 23–24, 51 (analogizing to the Superfund statute, which “has gotten along with a
very rough system for almost thirty years”). Given the difficulties of measuring and apportioning
climate change damages, Farber has also suggested using restitution or “unjust enrichment” as an
alternative standard for apportioning liability. He draws an analogy to calculations often made by
EPA in the context of calculating civil penalties for polluters. A computer program allows the
agency to estimate the economic benefit that a firm gained by delaying the adoption of a particular
pollution control technology or method. Farber suggests a similar approach might be taken with
CO2 emitters. See id. at 47–48.
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developing world to offset those historical emissions.162 Under a tort
model that requires culpability—a negligence model—we would begin
the historical accounting in the early 1990s, at a point when a reasonable
person should have known of the risks of climate change.163 But these
payments could not really be conceptualized as paying for mitigation,
because the past emissions they represented would already have been
released and could no longer be mitigated. Moreover, as detailed above,
the prospective aspect of an equal-shares approach would already
account for the costs of the mitigation measures that could still be taken.
Any shift of additional costs to the developed world would best be
attributed to the second category of damages: adaptation and
compensation.
While such payments would not necessarily correlate with the actual
adaptation and compensation costs incurred as a result of the emissions
they represent, they would constitute a significant sum over and above
mitigation damages. Because that sum would be tied to the level of past
emissions, it would have significant symbolic appeal. Those with higher
past emissions would pay more. This would comport with the corrective
justice goals of tort law. It would also serve the deterrence goals of tort
law, creating an incentive for polluters in the future to try to anticipate
trends in science, public policy, and law in order to avoid future
penalties for harmful conduct that might also be retroactively applied.
Thus, while a precise formula for allocating adaptation and
compensation costs under a tort model is probably out of reach, a
historical-equal-shares approach offers a reasonable second-best
solution.
The status quo approach, on the other hand, is a poor fit for allocating
adaptation and compensation costs under a tort model. Indeed, it fails to
take into account in any way the historical emissions that caused the
harms that adaptation and compensation costs seek to address. While
current emissions are in many instances generally reflective of a
country’s level of historical emissions in a very rough sense, this is not
always the case. In particular, a number of developing countries are
experiencing rapid economic growth that has led to a high level of
current emissions, even though their historical emissions were quite
low.164 Under a status quo approach, such a country might well pay the
same amount as a country with high historical emissions. Thus, a status
162. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the historical-equal-shares approach).
163. See supra Part III.B.1.
164. See RUCHI ANAND, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A NORTH-SOUTH
DIMENSION 30 (2004).
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quo approach unfairly penalizes developing countries, which bear little
responsibility for the adaptation and compensation costs incurred as a
result of historical emissions. In this way, it undermines both the
corrective justice and deterrence goals that underlie the tort model.
An ability-to-pay approach is similarly a poor fit for allocating
adaptation and compensation costs under a tort model because it also
fails to account for historical emissions. While it is generally true that
those countries with high GDPs also had high historical emissions, this
is not a perfect correlation. Indeed, as some developing countries like
China and India experience exponential GDP growth, the correlation is
becoming less and less tight over time. As with the status quo approach,
an ability-to-pay approach would unfairly penalize rapidly developing
countries that bear little responsibility for the adaptation and
compensation costs currently being incurred as a result of past
emissions.
In sum, a tort model would require countries whose current and past
(post-1990) emissions exceeded reasonable levels to bear the costs of
mitigation, adaptation, and compensation made necessary by those
excess emissions. Such a model comports extremely well with a per
capita approach to cost allocation. With respect to mitigation costs, the
conceptual fit with a prospective-equal-shares approach is near perfect,
if we assume a global cap that sets a reasonable, harm-avoiding level of
aggregate emissions. With respect to adaptation and compensation costs,
there is no perfect formula for cost assessment and allocation, but a
historical-equal-shares approach with an early 1990s start date offers a
reasonable second-best approximation that comports well with the
deterrence and corrective justice goals that underlie the tort model.
C.

A Tax Model: Allocating the Costs of a Common Enterprise

Finally, one can conceptualize the who-should-pay question as a tax
problem—a situation in which a group of persons or entities is engaged
in a common enterprise to promote the common good. In such a
situation, it is common to expect those with more than enough resources
(i.e., the ability to pay) to contribute more toward the common
enterprise.165 Income taxes regularly follow this principle, imposing

165. See EDWARD A. PAGE, CLIMATE CHANGE, JUSTICE AND FUTURE GENERATIONS 170–72
(2006); Shue, supra note 110, at 537–40; Climate Action Network, supra note 101, at 3 (“The
ability to pay and the capacity to act are important principles in deciding who should act, when and
in what way.”).
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higher tax rates on the rich than the poor,166 as do the formulas for
countries to contribute to the United Nations, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund.167 The U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change also incorporates this principle, committing the
developed nations to “protect the climate system . . . in accordance with
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities.”168 In Henry Shue’s words: “Even in an emergency one
pawns the jewelry before selling the blankets . . . whatever justice may
positively require, it does not permit that poor nations be told to sell their
blankets in order that the rich nations keep their jewelry.”169
This view aligns perfectly with the ability-to-pay approach. To the
extent that emissions track wealth, this view also aligns roughly with the
per capita approach, which would generally result in those countries
with the most wealth bearing the lion’s share of the costs of climate
change. It is at odds, however, with the status quo approach, which is
regressive and essentially the equivalent of a flat tax—taking the status
quo distribution of wealth (or emissions) as given and demanding an
equal percentage reduction from each party, whether rich or poor.170
D.

The Per Capita Approach as the Best Approximation of Justice

The above discussion demonstrates that the per capita approach is a
perfect fit with a property model of justice, a very good fit (and the best
of the three) with a tort model of justice, and comes in a close second

166. See HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL
ANALYSIS 5, 24, 40, 55, 76–77, 91, 102, 120, 139–40 (2d ed. 2004) (finding progressivity in the tax
structures of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States); Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for
Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 417 (1952) (“Progressive Taxation is now regarded
as one of the central ideas of modern democratic capitalism and is widely accepted as a secure
policy commitment which does not require serious examination.”). For defenses of progressive
taxation on normative grounds, see id. and Martin G.J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner
Take All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX. REV. 1, 10 (1998).
167. See Babiker & Eckaus, supra note 92, at 6.
168. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3, para. 1, May 9, 1992, UN
Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (emphasis added).
169. See Grubb, supra note 45, at 478 (quoting Henry Shue, The Unavoidability of Justice, in
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: ACTORS, INTERESTS & INSTITUTIONS, 373,
397 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992)).
170. Posner & Sunstein, Per Capita, supra note 45, at 81 (“Perversely, the status quo approach
creates a kind of entitlement to the continuation of practices that violate those requirements. No
such entitlement can be defended. Even if corrective justice does not require high-emissions states
to compensate those nations that are at special risk, a climate change agreement would be
unacceptably unfair if it made development more difficult for poor nations.”).
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with a tax model of justice. The status quo approach fares worst under
all three models, and thus can be easily rejected.171 The ability-to-pay
approach fares much better and, indeed, is the best fit under the tax
model. But it suffers a major drawback. By linking the cost allocation
directly to GDP rather than emissions, the ability-to-pay approach
creates the wrong incentives. It creates a weak incentive against
increasing GDP, which is undoubtedly outweighed by the numerous and
strong incentives that favor economic growth. But it fails to create any
incentive to keep emissions down while increasing GDP. The per capita
approach, in contrast, preserves the incentive to develop, but creates an
incentive to make development less carbon intensive.
Moreover, while the ability-to-pay approach provides the best fit with
a tax model of fairness, the tax model is arguably not the best fit for the
problem of climate change. By defining the issue in solely prospective
and positive terms—as allocating the costs of a common enterprise—the
tax model defines away an aspect of climate change that, to many
observers, is one of its most salient features: the large role that the
developed countries played in causing the problem historically to the
detriment of those in the developing world who played little, if any, role
in causing it. Thus, the tax model fails to capture an important element
of justice: holding those who caused the problem accountable. An
approach that fails to address this important aspect of the problem may
well have poor prospects for being perceived as fair and just, particularly
by those in the developing world. Under both the tort and property
models, in contrast, this aspect of justice plays a prominent role.
IV. A BACK-OF-THE-ENVELOPE CALCULATION
Considering all three models of justice, then, the per capita approach
comes out as the clear winner.172 It comports best with the first two

171. See 1 FLORENTIN KRAUSE ET AL., ENERGY POLICY IN THE GREENHOUSE 5–8 (1989) (“The
lowest level of equity would be achieved in allocations . . . on the basis of current release
patterns.”).
172. See AGARWAL & NARAIN, supra note 66, at 4; BARRY, supra note 62, at 267–68 (arguing
that “treating the atmosphere as a global commons to be divided up equally would itself constitute a
just distribution of a scarce resource”); BROWN, supra note 51, at 213–15 (arguing that the per
capita approach is just because it treats all individuals as equals, provides all people with equal
rights to use a global commons, and implements the polluter pays principle); CLINE, supra note 53,
at 353 (arguing a per capita allocation “has the merit of equity”); KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 171, at
5–6 (A per capita allocation “allow[s] a more rigorous equity approach: All human beings should be
equally entitled to make use of global resources such as the planet’s atmosphere.”); id. at 5–8 (“The
highest level of equity would be provided by [a per capita allocation formula].”); MEYER, supra
note 81, at 55 (“Since the world’s atmosphere belongs equally to everyone if it belongs to anyone at
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models, and with respect to the third, it comes in a close second. There
may be an argument for giving the tax model less weight in any case,
because it is prospective only and thus fails to take past actions into
account. Moreover, the perverse incentive against development that the
ability-to-pay approach fosters makes the per capita approach more
attractive as well.
So the per capita approach comports best with broadly shared notions
of justice and fairness, but what are the practical implications of this
conclusion? Since last year’s failed Copenhagen talks, the prospects of a
comprehensive international climate change agreement of any kind seem
bleak. Certainly, the chances of an international agreement instituting a
global cap-and-trade program and allocating allowances on a per capita
basis are virtually non-existent. Nonetheless, it is useful to try to
estimate the magnitude of the wealth transfer from the developed to the
developing world that such an approach would entail. Such an estimate
should at least inform our thinking about international negotiations.
We can do a rough, back-of-the-envelope calculation to get a ballpark
estimate of the amount of money that the developed world would
actually have to pay to the developing world to buy back the right to
emit greenhouse gases at current levels under a per capita approach. We
will use 2006, because that is the most recent year for which good
statistics are available. For simplicity’s sake, we will assume a “cap” of
the actual global emissions for that year, and we will take a prospectiveequal-shares approach. Keep in mind that a historical-equal-shares
approach would imply an even bigger payment from developed to
developing countries.
Global emissions of carbon dioxide in 2006 were 29 billion metric
tons and world population was 6.5 billion.173 Accordingly, a per capita
all, the only basis on which such an agreement seems possible is that there must . . . be an equal
quota allocation to everyone in the world.”); SINGER, supra note 64, at 43; Henry Shue, Avoidable
Necessity: Global Warming, International Fairness, and Alternative Energy, in NOMOS XXXVII:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 239, 257–58 (Ian Shapiro & Judith Wagner DeCew eds., 1995) (arguing
that carbon emissions are an essential of life, and that therefore, developed nations who emit more
than their fair share deprive people in poor nations of one of life’s essentials); Amy Sinden & Carl
Cranor, Toward Distributional Justice, in ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE
POLICY, supra note 5, at 237, 240 (“[T]he equality principle requires that we distribute to each
individual on the planet and equal share in the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere.”); The
Isolation of America, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Aug. 31, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/
international/germany/0,1518,503176,00.html (German Chancelor Angela Merkel advocates
equalizing worldwide per capita greenhouse-gas emissions).
173. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., WORLD ENERGY-RELATED CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS BY
FUEL TYPE, 1990–2030, at 1 (2009), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/excel/figure_81data.xls; U.S.
Census Bureau, Total Midyear Population for the World: 1950-2050, http://www.census.gov/
ipc/www/idb/worldpop.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).

SindenDTPed.doc (Do Not Delete)

2010]

5/17/2010 10:17 AM

CLIMATE CHANGE: EFFICIENCY VERSUS JUSTICE

343

allocation of those emissions would have worked out to approximately
4.4 metric tons of CO2 per person.174 Thus, under a per capita (equalshares) approach the United States, with a population of 298 million,175
would have been entitled to emit a total of only 1.3 billion metric tons of
carbon dioxide.176 In fact, total U.S. CO2 emissions in 2006 were around
6 billion metric tons.177 In contrast, India was entitled to emit 4.8 billion
metric tons of carbon dioxide in 2006,178 far more than its actual CO2
emissions, which were around 1.3 billion metric tons.179
In sum, a per capita approach to 2006 CO2 emissions leads to the
conclusion that U.S. carbon dioxide emissions were approximately 4.7
billion metric tons over its entitlement that year and that CO2 emissions
from developing countries were far less than their entitlements. If we
imagine a trading scheme in which the developed countries, like the
United States, were required to buy allowances from the developing
world for each ton of carbon dioxide they emitted in excess of their per
capita entitlement, how much money would the United States have to
pay to developing countries to pay back its CO2 debt?
This is no simple question. Under Phase II of the European Union’s
emissions trading system, allowances have been trading at between $11
and $42 per metric ton of CO2.180 At these prices, the U.S. “carbon debt”
to the developing world for just its 2006 emissions would be somewhere
between $52 billion and $197 billion. That translates to between 0.4 and
1.5 percent of U.S. GDP, which was roughly $13 trillion in 2006.181

174. Twenty-nine billion divided by 6.53 billion yields 4.44.
175. U.S. Census Bureau, International Database, http://www.census.gov/idb/ranks.html (select
2006 in the drop-down menu and click “Submit”) (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
176. Two hundred ninety-eight million multiplied by 4.4 equals 1.3 billion.
177. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2007),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/archive/gg08rpt/pdf/table1.pdf.
178. The population of India in 2006 was 1.1 billion, see U.S. Census Bureau, International
Database, http://www.census.gov/idb/ranks.html (select “2006” in the drop-down menu and click
“Submit”) (last visited Apr. 10, 2010), which, multiplied by 4.44 metric tons, yields 4.88 billion
metric tons.
179. See World Resources Institute-Climate Analysis Indicators Tool, Total GHG Emissions in
2006 (on file with author), available at http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=yearly (free registration
required).
180. See European Climate Exchange, ECX EUA Indices, http://www.ecx.eu/ECX-EUA-Indices
(last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (reporting prices during Phase II ranging from approximately 8 to 30
Euros per metric ton of CO2, which—assuming a 1:1.4 euros to dollars exchange rate—is roughly
equivalent to $11 to $42 per metric ton of CO2).
181. See U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Current-Dollar and “Real” Gross Domestic Product
(Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdplev.xls.
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But these prices are essentially arbitrary, based largely on a political
decision to set the cap at a particular level, and do not necessarily reflect
the true “value” of a ton of CO2 emissions. Estimates of the “social cost
of carbon”—the monetary value of the damage done by an incremental
ton of carbon emissions—vary wildly, from less than $0 to over $400
per metric ton of CO2.182 Indeed, there are strong arguments that
attempting to express in monetary terms the many varied, complex, and
uncertain harms associated with global climate change is a fool’s errand
and that any such estimate will inevitably undercount the true costs of
climate change.183 Nonetheless, such estimates can perhaps at least give
us a ballpark sense of the magnitude of the carbon debt owed by the
developed to the developing world.
The Stern Review estimated the social cost of carbon at $85 per
metric ton of CO2, which would put the 2006 U.S. carbon debt at 3% of
GDP.184 Using the Stern Review as a basis for its own estimate, the
United Kingdom set the price of carbon to be used in government reports
at £25 in 2007,185 or approximately $40 per metric ton of CO2.186 Using
this value would put the U.S. carbon debt at around 1.4 % of GDP. In
the United States, an inter-agency work group recently produced a report
providing a range of estimates for the social cost of carbon ranging from
182. NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 322 (2006).
183. See Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive
Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555 (2004) (criticizing attempts to quantify and monetize
harms of climate change); Richard S.J. Tol, The Social Cost of Carbon: Trends, Outliers and
Catastrophes 2, ECON.: OPEN-ACCESS, OPEN-ASSESSMENT E-J. (Aug. 12, 2008),
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/2008-25
(acknowledging
that
estimates of the social cost of carbon (SCC) often “omit some impacts . . . tend to ignore
interactions between different impacts and neglect higher order effects on the economy and
population . . . use simplistic models of adaptation . . often ignore uncertainties, . . . and use
controversial valuation measures”).
184. See STERN, supra note 182, at 322.
185. See ECON. GROUP, U.K. DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS (DEFRA), THE
SOCIAL COST OF CARBON AND THE SHADOW PRICE OF CARBON: WHAT THEY ARE, AND HOW TO
USE THEM IN ECONOMIC APPRAISAL IN THE UK 7 (2007), http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/
content/cms/what_we_do/lc_uk/valuation/shadow_price/shadow_price.aspx (the Report’s title is a
link to the PDF); see also U.K. DEP’T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON APPRAISAL IN UK
POLICY APPRAISAL: A REVISED APPROACH 23–35 (2009), http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/
content/cms/what_we_do/lc_uk/valuation/valuation.aspx (the Report’s title is a link to the PDF)
[hereinafter U.K. DEP’T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE] (adopting a new approach to valuing CO2
emissions based on marginal abatement costs rather than damages and estimating such costs at £25
to £60 in the short term). But see generally Elizabeth A. Stanton & Frank Ackerman, Out of the
Shadows: What’s Behind DEFRA’s New Approach to the Price of Carbon, SEI PROJECT REP.
(Stockholm Env’t Inst., Stockholm, Swed.), July 2008, http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/
shadow_price_of_carbon.pdf (criticizing the UK estimate as too low).
186. British pounds converted to U.S. dollars using a conversion rate of £1.00 = $1.625.
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$5 and $65 per metric ton of CO2.187 These estimates, which are
controversial and have already received criticism for being too low,188
would put the U.S. carbon debt somewhere between 0.2% and 2.4% of
GDP.
In this light, the developing countries’ demand that the developed
countries contribute 1% of GDP to the climate change effort actually
seems quite reasonable. A prospective-equal-shares approach could
easily result in payments at that level, if not higher,189 and that is without
even taking historical emissions into account.
V.

IN DEFENSE OF THE PER CAPITA APPROACH

Though many authors treat a per capita allocation scheme as selfevidently the most fair and equitable190 (though perhaps facing
challenges with regard to feasibility), several authors have criticized this
approach. This Part considers and responds to several of those criticisms.

187. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
FINAL RULE TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT (TSD): ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAM FOR
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT: SMALL ELECTRIC MOTORS, app. 15A.2 (2010)
(“Monetizing Carbon Dioxide Emissions”), available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/
appliance_standards/commercial/pdfs/smallmotors_tsd/sem_finalrule_appendix15a.pdf [hereinafter
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY].
188. See FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH A. STANTON, THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 7 (2010)
(“[T]he working group’s interim and revised SCC estimates rely on a biased and incomplete reading
of the economic literature on climate change. The methods used to set these values reveal an
unexplained confidence in a handful of authors and models and offer arbitrary, unsupported
judgments as grounds for ignoring important alternatives. Most of the errors, omissions, and
arbitrary judgments tend to reduce the estimate of the SCC; a corrected version of the same
calculations, therefore, would likely result in a larger SCC.”). The U.S. working group study relied
heavily on a recent study by Richard Tol. See Tol, supra note 183. This “meta-analysis” surveyed
211 estimates of the social cost of carbon in the economics literature and concluded that the mean
estimate was approximately $20 to $25 per metric ton of carbon in 2000 dollars, id. at 9–10, which
translates into $5 to $7 per metric ton of CO2. Tol has been criticized, however, for using a highly
skewed sample. See ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra, at 8–11. Of the 211 studies included, for
example, 112 were authored by Tol. They did not represent 112 separate estimates of the SCC, but
rather simply multiple scenarios and sensitivity analyses within the same small number of studies.
Tol’s models were also based on certain unwarranted assumptions, like the assumption that climate
change in the early stages will produce a large reduction in mortality. Id.
189. Assessments of the social cost of carbon generally assume that the cost will increase over
time. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 187, at 2 (estimating SCC rising from $16 to $136 per
metric ton CO2 by 2050); U.K. DEP’T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 185, at 3
(estimating SCC rising to £200 per metric ton of CO2 by 2050).
190. See supra note 172.
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Allowances Awarded to Governments, Not People

One common objection to the per capita approach is that it awards
allowances to countries, not people.191 Because so many countries,
particularly in the developing world, are ruled by corrupt and nondemocratic governments, this argument posits that the wealth generated
by the excess allowances allocated to the developing world will go, not
to help those countries’ citizens, but to line the pockets of dictators.
While this objection raises an important point about implementation,
it does not fundamentally challenge the theoretical soundness of the per
capita approach. The point of this Article is not to propose any particular
mechanism for implementing cost sharing among countries. Nor does it
presume that any international agreement that actually gets hammered
out through the political process will in the end be shaped primarily by
principles of justice and fairness. The point here is simply to paint a
picture of what an agreement based solely on such principles would look
like, in the hopes that such a vision at least can be acknowledged and
perhaps play a role in pushing the developed world to take on more of
the costs of climate change.
It is certainly valid to ask whether the political necessity of
implementing a per capita approach in a second-best manner, by giving
allowances to governments rather than individuals, so undermines the
equity of the proposal that it is not worth following through with.192 But
the problem this question identifies arises any time we try to provide aid
to developing countries. While it is important to try to devise ways to
deliver such aid that minimize the risk that it will be hijacked by corrupt
political leaders, it is not clear that we should abandon all efforts at
foreign aid on these grounds.
Exactly how such cost sharing is implemented is a separate question.
If it takes the form of cash payments to the developing world,
presumably some mechanism can be developed to ensure that such funds
are not funneled to the coffers of corrupt governments. Even if cost
sharing takes the form of an allocation of allowances to the developing
world, such allowances need not necessarily be given to governments

191. See Beckerman & Pasek, supra note 30, at 409; Posner & Sunstein, Justice, supra note 37, at
1586–87; Posner & Sunstein, Per Capita, supra note 45, at 75.
192. See Beckerman & Pasek, supra note 30, at 408 (“[S]ince sovereign nation states are the
primary actors in international politics, intercountry redistribution should be viewed as a ‘secondbest’ solution to the global application of the difference principle.” (citing Charles Beitz,
International Distributive Justice, in PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 27 (Steven Luper-Foy
ed., 1988))).
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directly. They might instead be allocated to aid groups with a proven
track record, or to the World Bank’s carbon fund, for example.
B.

Failure to Account for Differential Effects of Climate Change

Another objection to the per capita approach is its failure to account
for the different effects that climate change is likely to have in different
regions of the globe. Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein, for example, take
this view:
Some poor states will become far poorer as a result of climate
change; other poor states are less vulnerable. Similarly, some
rich states will face serious adverse economic effects from
climate change; other rich states are less vulnerable. Some states
may even be net gainers from climate change. If distribution is
our concern, why should two highly populated poor nations
receive the same number of permits from a program from which
one nation would gain a lot and another a little—or from which
one would gain a lot and another would actually lose? Ideally,
permits should be distributed in light of these consequences, but
the per capita approach fails to take them into account.193
Posner and Sunstein view redistribution of wealth from the rich to the
poor as a worthy goal on both fairness and welfarist grounds.194 A more
equal distribution of wealth promotes fairness, and the declining
marginal utility of money means that it also promotes welfarist goals.
Because a dollar is worth more to a poor person than a rich person,
redistribution from rich to poor increases overall social welfare.195 But
the per capita approach falls short, in their view, because it fails to take
into account all aspects of wealth, including the costs and benefits that
will arise from climate change mitigation itself.196
One problem with such arguments is that they overstate the extent to
which the impacts of climate change will vary. While climate change
may produce some isolated beneficial effects in certain regions in the

193. Posner & Sunstein, Per Capita, supra note 45, at 74–75; see also Babiker & Eckaus, supra
note 92, at 2–3 (noting that climate change will have differential impacts across the globe, and “[i]n
principle, it is necessary to know both costs and benefits in order to place a value on the public good
created by emissions constraints”).
194. See Posner & Sunstein, Per Capita, supra note 45, at 72, 80.
195. See Beckerman & Pasek, supra note 30, at 406 (“[I]deally, the maximization of utility of the
whole human race would no doubt justify international redistribution.”); Posner & Sunstein, Per
Capita, supra note 45, at 72 (“[O]ther things being equal, distribution to those who are poor will
increase welfare.”).
196. See Posner & Sunstein, Per Capita, supra note 45, at 74–75.
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short term, in the long term, the effects will be unqualifiedly bad.197
Moreover, there is a small but non-trivial risk that the results will be
catastrophic.198 Additionally, to suppose that the regional impacts of
climate change will remain confined to those regions is naïve at best.
Even the U.S. Department of Defense is concerned that widespread food
shortages, disease, floods, and droughts in the developing world will
produce political instability in many regions that will pose a grave
national security threat in this country.199 Criticisms of the per capita
approach for its failure to account for the differential effects of climate
change also overstate the extent to which we can accurately predict the
impacts of climate change.
But the bigger problem is that this argument shifts the question from
what is a fair initial allocation of costs or allowances to what is a fair
allocation of outcomes.200 By subtly shifting the question in this way,
such arguments succeed in complicating the issue so that any equitybased solution can be criticized as being incomplete and imperfect. Once
the relevant “wealth” to be distributed includes the costs and benefits of
climate change mitigation, most of which are highly uncertain and will
not come to fruition for many years, a full accounting in order to design
a fair or welfare maximizing distribution becomes impossible.201
Indeed, Posner and Sunstein shift the target even further, until the
goal is no longer just distributing the “wealth” of the atmosphere or the
“wealth” of climate change regulation generally, but nothing less than a
wholesale redistribution of all wealth on earth:
[T]here is no reason to think that the per capita approach to
climate regulation is the right way to redistribute wealth and
thus to increase global welfare. From a welfarist perspective, a
sensible redistributive policy would . . . redistribute all resources
rather than shares of the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb
greenhouse gases.202
197. See Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 1531, 1599–1601 (2009); IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 48 (2007),
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.
198. See Freeman & Guzman, supra note 197, at 1554.
199. See Heinzerling, supra note 74, at 448–49.
200. See Rose, supra note 30, at 29–30 (identifying “equity in “initial allocation” and “equity in
“final outcome” as two separate ways to think about equity in climate change context).
201. See Jamieson, supra note 3, at 288 (“[T]here is no way to assess accurately all the possible
impacts [of global climate change] and to assign economic values to alternative courses of action. A
greenhouse warming, if it occurs, will have impacts that are so broad, diverse, and uncertain that
conventional economic analysis is practically useless.”).
202. Posner & Sunstein, Per Capita, supra note 45, at 75.
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Under this new standard, if the per capita approach does not achieve a
perfectly fair or welfare-maximizing redistribution of all of the wealth
on the planet among all of the people on the planet, it misses the mark.
Against such a monumentally ambitious goal, it is easy to find virtually
any proposal sorely wanting.
Having redefined the normative goal as overall redistribution of all
forms of wealth (rather than the far simpler goal of redistributing the
“wealth” of the atmosphere), Posner and Sunstein then object that “the
per capita system is only indirectly connected to the underlying
normative goal—indeed, so indirectly that it is conceivable in principle
that it has worse distributive effects than the status quo approach.”203 It
is technically “conceivable,” I suppose, that a per capita approach could
have negative distributive effects. But in light of the way the projected
impacts of climate change and the responsibility for causing it are
distributed across the globe, on this planet, at least, the per capita
approach tracks the goal of overall wealth redistribution remarkably
well.204
The bottom line is that, by insisting that if we are going to distribute
any one resource, we have to take on a massive redistribution of all
resources on earth, Posner and Sunstein doom any equity-based
argument for the distribution of emissions allowances to certain failure.
And yet, it is not even clear that generalized wealth redistribution is an
appropriate goal. Certainly, it is a highly controversial goal—far more
controversial than a goal of simply redistributing one particular kind of
wealth—here, the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere. The classic
argument against generalized wealth redistribution—that taking
resources away from the wealthy will undermine incentives for hard
work—does not translate to this context. One might try to argue that
those who have used the lion’s share of the atmosphere worked hard to
do so, producing valuable economic goods in the process, and that if we
take their share of the atmosphere away, we will lessen their incentive to
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. Greenhouse-gas emissions are highly correlated with wealth, and, in a cruel twist of fate, the
burdens of climate change are highly correlated with poverty. PARRY ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 294, 317, 383 (2007). Some of this is simply
the luck of geography. A number of the most severe and disruptive impacts of climate change,
including drought, sea level rise, and the spread of disease, are projected to be particularly harsh in
the developing world. But in other respects, the disparate impacts of climate change are driven by
existing inequalities. Poor countries, as well as poor communities within developed countries, are
likely to suffer more from climate change because resources and infrastructure are already stretched
thin in poor communities, and because they have fewer resources to devote to adaptation. See
Richard S.J. Tol et al., Distributional Aspects of Climate Change Impacts, 14 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 259, 264–66 (2004).
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work hard in the future. But redistributing the absorptive capacity of the
atmosphere still leaves in place the status quo distribution of all other
forms of wealth and so leaves plenty of incentives for productive work.
It removes only the incentives to engage in carbon-intensive forms of
production, which is precisely what we need to do to tackle the climate
crisis in any case.
Ultimately, Posner and Sunstein acknowledge that the per capita
approach comports with principles of fairness and welfare considerably
better than the status quo approach.205 In the end, they reject it on
pragmatic grounds, observing that “[t]here is little reason that the rich
states would be willing to agree to such an approach” because it is not in
their self-interest.206 While it is undoubtedly true that rich countries,
particularly the United States, will balk at the notion that they should
pay hundreds of billions of dollars to the developing world, in thinking
about international climate policy there is still a place for a normative
analysis that puts aside political constraints to focus on what justice
would require.207
C.

Arguments Against a Historical Approach

Two arguments are frequently raised against any allocation scheme
that holds countries responsible for past emissions. First, some argue
that it is not fair to hold present generations accountable for the actions
of prior generations.208 Second, some argue that it is unfair to penalize
developed countries for emissions that occurred before it was reasonably
foreseeable that such emissions might lead to harm.209 Both of these
arguments can largely be diffused by simply beginning the historical
accounting at some date by which it is reasonable to say that the
scientific understanding of climate change was clear. We might pick
1990, the date of the IPCC’s first assessment report.210 Alternatively, we
205. Posner & Sunstein, Per Capita, supra note 45, at 86 (“In light of . . . justifications [based in
welfare or fairness] the per capita approach . . . seems . . . to be far better than the status quo
approach.”).
206. Id. at 89. See also Beckerman & Pasek, supra note 30, at 406 (rejecting as impractical the
application of utilitarian theories of justice to the climate change context).
207. See Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 1605, 1607–08 (2008) [hereinafter Farber, Basic Compensation].
208. See, e.g., PAGE, supra note 165, at 168–69.
209. See Posner & Sunstein, Justice, supra note 37, at 1598–99.
210. See Heinzerling, supra note 74, at 460 (arguing that scientific consensus on climate change
became clear in the late 1980s or early 1990s). Posner and Sunstein acknowledge that the case for
finding emitters negligent is stronger after 1990. See Posner & Sunstein, Justice, supra note 37, at
1598 n.146.
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could pick 1992, the year negotiations were completed on the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change.211 These dates are recent
enough to make the prior-generations objection considerably less
forceful. Moreover, because global emissions have increased so
dramatically in recent decades, and because greenhouse gases do not
linger forever in the atmosphere, beginning the accounting at some point
in the early 1990s would still capture most of the historical emissions
currently accumulated in the atmosphere. Nonetheless, these two
arguments are addressed below.
1.

Ignorance of Prior Generations

Some argue that it is unfair to hold people responsible for
greenhouse-gas emissions that occurred before a scientific consensus
had developed on climate change and before the dangers of climate
change had become a matter of common knowledge and widespread
political discourse. This argument has obvious traction under a tort
theory of justice, because liability in tort often requires some finding of
culpability, (which requires at least objective knowledge by the
wrongdoer that her actions might cause harm).212 Even a low standard of
culpability, like negligence, requires a finding that the wrongdoer knew
or should have known that her actions might cause harm.213 But even
under tort law, knowledge is not universally required. As discussed
above, strict liability regimes impose liability in the absence of
knowledge by the wrongdoer.214 And while such a regime is more
difficult to justify under the corrective justice goals of tort law, it can
serve deterrence goals.
This argument has less traction under a property theory. It might be
reasonable to argue that one who used up a disproportionate share of the
atmosphere before she reasonably could have known that it was a
limited resource should not be penalized. But property law does not
always require intent to violate legal or moral norms. While a trespasser
must intend to be on the land that she is on, she need not have an intent
to trespass (i.e., knowledge that the land she is on is privately owned).215

211. See Farber, Apportioning, supra note 118, at 32 (suggesting 1992 as a cut-off date for
apportioning responsibility for climate change adaptation according to a polluter pays principle);
Farber, Basic Compensation, supra note 207, at 1641.
212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965).
213. See id.
214. See id. § 519.
215. See id. § 329.
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By analogy, one might argue that one who intended to burn coal and
thus to release pollutants (including CO2) into the atmosphere, should be
liable for using up more than her fair share of the atmosphere even in the
absence of knowledge that the atmosphere is a limited resource that
would need to be legally apportioned.
From a philosophical perspective, Henry Shue finds the argument
against historical responsibility for those lacking knowledge of climate
change unconvincing. He points out that “[t]his objection rests upon a
confusion between punishment and responsibility.”216 It is not fair to
punish people for acts that produced unforeseeable effects. But on the
other hand, we frequently hold people responsible for unforeseeable and
unavoidable harms. Shue explains it this way:
[I]n order to be justifiable, an inequality in something between
two or more parties must be compatible with an equality of
dignity and respect between the parties. If there were an
inequality between two groups of people such that members of
the first group could create problems and then expect members
of the second group to deal with the problems, that inequality
would be incompatible with equal respect and equal dignity. For
the members of the second group would in fact be functioning as
servants for the first group. If I said to you, “I broke it but I want
you to clean it up,” then I would be your master and you would
be my servant. If I thought that you should do my bidding, I
could hardly respect you as my equal.217
2.

Present Generations Not Responsible for the Acts of Prior
Generations

Even if it is appropriate to hold people in prior decades or centuries
responsible for the harms caused by greenhouse-gas emissions before
the phenomenon of climate change was widely understood, is it
appropriate to hold current generations accountable for the actions of
their ancestors?218 This has been called “the wrongdoer identity
problem.”219 It rests on the fundamental and unobjectionable principle

216. Shue, supra note 110, at 535.
217. Id.
218. See Babiker & Eckaus, supra note 92, at 7; Simon Caney, Environmental Degradation,
Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History, 37 J. SOC. PHIL. 464, 468 (2006); Posner &
Sunstein, Justice, supra note 37, at 1593–94.
219. Posner & Sunstein, Justice, supra note 37, at 1593; see also Babiker & Eckhaus, supra note
92, at 7.

SindenDTPed.doc (Do Not Delete)

2010]

5/17/2010 10:17 AM

CLIMATE CHANGE: EFFICIENCY VERSUS JUSTICE

353

that it is wrong to hold some one responsible for the acts of some other,
unrelated person.
But the question is, just how unrelated are the citizens of a given
country from the generations that came before them?220 Current
generations in the developed world continue to reap the benefits of the
industrialization that was brought about through carbon-emitting
activities over past decades and centuries. As such, it is appropriate to
hold them responsible under a theory of unjust enrichment.221
Additionally, those who make this argument tend to overstate the
problem.222 While a significant portion of the greenhouse gases currently
accumulated in the atmosphere were put there by the activities of prior
generations, because emissions rates have increased so quickly in recent
years, the majority of the greenhouse gases that are now in the
atmosphere were put there during the last two decades.223
CONCLUSION
In international negotiations on climate change, the developed world
is speaking the language of efficiency while the developing world is
speaking the language of justice. The principle of efficiency is helpful
for determining who should reduce emissions. When it comes to the far
more contentious issue of who should pay, however, the efficiency
principle obscures the real issues and implicitly promotes a status quo
approach. When judged according to widely accepted principles of
fairness and justice, on the other hand, a per capita approach to the whoshould-pay question is clearly superior to the alternatives.

220. Shue, supra note 110, at 536.
221. PAGE, supra note 165, at 170–73.
222. See Babiker & Eckaus, supra note 92, at 7 (“[I]t is not the current generations that produced
most of the accumulated greenhouse gas emissions.”); Caney, supra note 218, at 468
(“Obviously . . . almost all of those individuals are no longer alive.”).
223. See Daniel A. Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate Change
Victims in a Complex World, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 377, 387 (finding the United States produced 10%
of all CO2 emissions it had ever produced up to that point in 2000–2004).

